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Abstract
This Note examines the relationship between the arbitral institution and the disputing parties.
Part I demonstrates the decisions parties face when choosing between traditional litigation and
arbitration; it also discusses the differences between an arbitral institution and an ad hoc arbitra-
tion, as well as major arbitral institutions’ rules regarding their own liability. Part II introduces
several nations’ approaches to judicial immunity, and how it is applied to arbitrators and arbitral
institutions. Part II also weighs differing views on how to characterize the relationship between
disputing parties and the arbitral institution. Finally, Part II discusses several key criticisms to
the immunity of arbitral institutions. Part III will demonstrate the need for arbitral institutions’
contractual liability to disputing parties, and will address several potential criticisms and policy
concerns of this approach.
OVEREXTENDING IMMUNITY: ARBITRAL INSTITUTIONAL
LIABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES,
ENGLAND, AND FRANCE
Matthew Rasmussen*
INTRODUCTION
Fried Trading Company ("Fried"), an options trading part-
nership and a member of the Chicago Board Options Exchange
("CBOE"), had a trading partnership agreement with Mr. and
Mrs. Austern ("the Austerns"), residents of Israel.' A dispute
arose between Fried and the Austerns over monies due under
the trading agreement: Under the arbitration clause contained
in the trading agreement, Fried filed a petition for arbitration
with the CBOE in September 1984.' When the Austerns an-
swered the petition in November 1984, the CBOE accepted the
matter for arbitration:
The selection of the arbitration panel and the procedures to
be followed in the arbitration were governed by the arbitration
rules of the CBOE.t These rules mandated that the panel be
composed of five arbitrators, no more than two of whom could
be from the securities industry,7 and that notice of the hearing
* J.D. Candidate 2004. This Note is dedicated to Philip Kimbrough and Gregory
Good for sparking my interest in international arbitration. I would like to thank Profes-
sorJacqueline Nolan-Haley for her invaluable insight and guidance. Special thanks to
Daniel Smith for all of his support and guidance in attempting to make this Note com-
prehensible.
1. See Chicago Board Options Exchange ("CBOE"), About CBOE, The History of
CBOE, at http://www.cboe.com/AboutCBOE/Histoiy.asp. The CBOE was founded in
1973. [d. The CBOE created standardized, listed stock options. Id. Previously, options
were traded on an unregulated basis. Id. The CBOE quickly became the second largest
security exchange in the United States and the world's largest options exchange. id.
2. See Austern v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc., 898 F.2d 882, 884 (2d Cir. 1990)
(noting trading partnership agreement between parties in case).
3. See id. (indicating that dispute between parties arose regarding money due
under trading agreement).
4. See id. (noting trading agreement contained arbitration clause for any disagree-
ments arising from agreement and Fried Trading Company ("Fried") filed petition for
arbitration on September 1984 pursuant to that clause).
5. See id. (stating that Austerns initially answered petition and Chicago Board Op-
tions Exchange ("CBOE") accepted matter for arbitration).
6. See id. (noting that CBOE arbitration rules govern arbitral proceedings).
7. See Chicago Board Options Exchange Arbitration Rules, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION:
PRACTICE AND FORMS (W. Reece Bader, ed., 2002) [hereinafter CBOE Arbitration Rules]
Rule 18.10(a)(1). Rule 18.10(a)(1) states:
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be given to each of the parties at least eight business days in
advance of the date of the hearing.'
In September 1986, the Austerns withdrew their appear-
ance, answer, and counterclaim.9 Nonetheless, the CBOE con-
tinued with the arbitration selection and proceedings."' One
month later, the panel of five arbitrators designated by the
CBOE conducted an ex parte hearing and issued an award in
favor of Fried.''
In administrating the Fried arbitration, the CBOE failed to
fulfill two of the requirements of its own rules: all five arbitrators
were from the securities industry and, despite the CBOE's at-
tempts, the Austerns never received any notice of the hearing.'
2
The Austerns sued the CBOE for negligent empanelling and
In all arbitration matters involving public customers and nonmembers where
the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000 or where the matter in controversy
does not involve or disclose a money claim, the Director of Arbitration shall
appoint an arbitration panel which shall consist of no less than three (3) arbi-
trators, at least a majority of whom shall not be from the securities industry,
unless the public customer or non-member requests a panel consisting of at
least a majority firom the securities industry.
1d. Note that these rules have been amended, originally requiring five arbitrators, but
still requiring at least a majority from outside the securities industry. See Austern, 898
F.2d at 884 (quoting rules in force at time of case).
8. See CBOE Arbitration Rides, at Rule 18.16. Rule 18.16 states:
Unless the law directs otherwise, the time and place for the initial hearing
shall be determined by the Director of Arbitration and each hearing thereaf-
ter by the arbitrators. Notice of the time and place for the initial hearing shall
be given at least eight (8) business days prior to the date fixed for the hearing
by personal service, registered or certified mail to each of the parties unless
the parties shall, by their mutual consent, waive the notice provisions under
this section. Notice for each hearing, thereafter, shall be given as the arbitra-
tors may determine. Attendance at a hearing waives notice thereof.
Id.
9. See A wsterri, 898 F.2d at 884 (noting that Austerns withdrew appearance, answer,
and counterclaim and discussing briefly Austerns' withdrawal noting Austerns were con-
fused regarding with whom they were arbitrating but without illuminating why).
10. See id. (noting that panel continued with case despite having received with-
drawal). The CBOE sent notice of the hearing to the Austerns' previous counsel,
Sachnoff, Weaver, and Rubenstein ("Sachnoff"), even though the Austerns' had indi-
cated they would be representing themselves. See Austern v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch.,
Inc., 716 F.Supp. 121, 122-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). Furthermore, Sachnoff received the no-
tice seven business days prior to the hearing. Id. Sachnoff informed the court that they
no longer represented the Austerns, but noted they would forward the notice to the
Austerns. Id. The Austerns never received notice. Id.
11. See Austern, 898 F.2d at 884 (noting panel, ruling ex parte, held for Fried award-
ing US$158,000).
12. See id. (discussing attempt by CBOE to send notice of hearing, but noting Aus-
terns never receised iil)
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scheduling of the arbitration proceedings, claiming an injury of
US$612,000.'3 The district court ruled that the CBOE, as the
organization sponsoring the arbitration, was immune from civil
liability under the doctrine of arbitral immunity.' 4
The Austerns claimed that the CBOE's acts did not merit
arbitral immunity because they were administrative or ministe-
rial in nature.' 5 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed the decision, noting that extending arbitral
immunity to institutions that sponsor arbitration is both natural
and necessary in order to protect the policies that underlie arbi-
tral immunity; otherwise the arbitrator's immunity is merely an
illusion.' This case illustrates the issues courts face when decid-
ing the liability of institutions that fail to uphold their adminis-
trative duties: What is the nature of the relationship between the
arbitral institution and the disputing parties? Should these insti-
tutions be granted immunity as an extension of the immunity
granted to arbitrators based on their quasi-judicial function or
functional comparability to judges? If so, should this immunity
be unlimited?
Part I of this Note will demonstrate the decisions parties
face when choosing between traditional litigation and arbitra-
tion. Part I will discuss the differences between arbitrating with
an arbitral institution versus participating in an ad hoc arbitra-
tion. Part I will explain the function of arbitral institutional
rules and then discuss several major arbitral institutions' rules
with regard to their own liability. Part II will introduce several
nations' approaches to judicial immunity and how it is applied
to, first, arbitrators and, second, arbitral institutions. Part II will
also weigh differing views on how to characterize the relation-
ship between the disputing parties and the arbitral institution.
13. See id. (noting that Austerns sued CBOE for negligent empanelling of arbitral
panel and failing to provide proper notice of hearing).
14. See Austern, 716 F. Supp. at 123-24 (holding that arbitral institutions cannot be
held liable for actions regarding arbitration because, as sponsors of arbitrations, they
need same immunity as arbitrators).
15. See Austern, 898 F.2d at 885 (citing Austerns' argument that due to administra-
tive nature of duties of CBOE, they should not be immune).
16. See id. at 886 (stating institutions sponsoring arbitrations must be granted im-
munity in order to protect arbitrators, or immunity protecting arbitrators is meaning-
less). See also Corey, 691 F.2d at 1211 (stating arbitral institutions must be granted im-
munity in order to protect integrity of arbitrators and their decisions, otherwise parties
could collaterally attack arbitrators through attacking institutions).
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Finally, Part II will discuss several key criticisms to the immunity
of arbitral institutions. Part III will demonstrate the need for
arbitral institutions' contractual liability to disputing parties, al-
beit a limited liability, requiring the institutions to fulfill their
essential obligations, not provide a perfect arbitration. Part III
will address several potential criticisms of this approach and gen-
eral policy concerns.
I. WARMING UP: SHOULD A PARTY ARBITRATE A CLAIM
AND IF SO, WITH WHOM?
International parties undergo a decision-making process
when choosing between litigation and alternate dispute resolu-
tion and between the different methods of alternative dispute
resolution. 7 In choosing, the parties must weigh the advantages
and disadvantages of each process. 8 When a party chooses arbi-
tration as a method, the party faces further decisions within the
process of arbitration because of the choices created through
the flexibility of the process. 9
A. Choosing a Process
Arbitration is the most preferred form of dispute resolution
in international commercial relations, making it the primary al-
ternative to traditional litigation.2 ' In international commercial
17. See Robert D. Fischer & Roger S. Haydock, Drafting an Enforceable Arbitration
Agreement, in THE ARBITRATION PROCESS, COMP. L. Y.B. OF INT'L. Bus., SPECIAL ISSUE
2001 29, at 31-32 (Dennis Campbell ed., 2002) (noting that parties have choice regard-
ing how their disputes can best be resolved). See also JOSEPH M. LOOKOFSKY, TRANSNA-
TIONAL LITIGATION AND COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF AMERI-
CAN, EUROPEAN, AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 559 (1992) (discussing arbitration as alterna-
tive to traditional litigation and noting parties choose whether to arbitrate or litigate).
18. See LoOKOFSKY, supra n.17, at 559-60 (mentioning perceived virtues and draw-
backs to international arbitration). See also Fischer, supra n.17, at 33-47 (weighing
strengths and weaknesses of arbitration).
19. See Fischer, supra n.17, at 34-35 (noting flexibility of and adaptability of
method and discussing ability to customize process whether that be choice between
institutional or ad hoc arbitration or choice of law, applicable rules of procedure, selec-
tion of arbitrators, or even which languages proceedings will be conducted in). See also.
LOOKOFSKY, supra n.17, at 559-62 (noting arbitration is flexible creating choices for par-
ties).
20. See MAI-MOOD BAGHERI, INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS AND NATIONAL ECONOMIC
REGULATION: DISPUTE RESOLUTION THROUGH INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
106 (2000) (noting arbitration is more frequently used than any other form of alterna-
tive dispute resolution). See also LOOKOFsv, supra n.17, at 559 (stating arbitration is used
more than any other alternative to litigation); Fischer, supra n.17, at 29 (discussing
2003] 1827
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arbitration, the parties voluntarily contract away their right to
litigate disputes in national courts, which otherwise would have
had jurisdiction over the dispute.2 ' Because large sophisticated
parties would not forego their access to national courts without
carefully exploring the advantages and disadvantages of the pro-
cess, they must perceive that the advantages of arbitration out-
weigh the disadvantages.2 2 Some commentators contend that ar-
bitration will continue its present popularity so long as the law
maintains sufficient hold over the process to prevent substantial
injustice. 3
International businesses often prefer arbitration to litiga-
tion because they see arbitration as a faster and less expensive
means of dispute resolution, though whether this is the case is
debatable.2 4 Arbitration allows for the possibility of more infor-
roots of alternative dispute resolution and noting its preeminence in international com-
mercial dispute resolution).
21. See LooKoFSKy, supra n. 17, at 559 (discussing that arbitrating is choice of par-
ties by contracting away right to access national courts). See also Fischer, supra n. 17, at
30-33 (noting that parties in international commercial arbitration choose voluntarily to
arbitrate over traditional litigation).
22. See LooKosKv, supna n.17, at 559 (noting that businesses perceive advantages
of arbitration as being lower cost and faster process). See also Fischer, su/,ra n. 17, at 32
(mentioning reasons why parties would prefer arbitration over traditional justice sys-
tems).
23. See Czarnikow v. Roth Schmidt & Co [1922] 2 KB 478, per Banks L] at 484.
(advocating that arbitration must be well governed, ensuring jtustice, in order to survive
as alternative to litigation). This was with respect to English domestic arbitration. d. It
is of equal, if not greater, significance in international commercial arbitration. Id. See
Martin Odams de Zylva, Restraininig the Exercise of Power: 0 JInstitutions and Arbitrators, in
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: DEVELOPIN(. RULFS FOR THE NEW MILLEN-
NIUM 33, at 49 (Martin Odams de Zylva & Reziya Harrison ed., 2000) (arguing arbitra-
tion will continue to be popular so long as arbitral institutions, as service providers,
demonstrate to users that they will be treated fairly and stating this is equally true if not
more true in context of international arbitration).
24. See Thomas Allen, Institutional Rules: Straitjacket or ScaJJbld?, in INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL. ARBITRATION: DEVELOPINc. RULES FOR iHE NEW MILLENNIUM, supra n.23, at
59 (stating advantages of arbitration include lower cost and faster resolution than litiga-
tion). See also LOOKOFSKY, supra n.17, at 559-60 (noting parties see arbitration as being
faster and cheaper than litigation); BAGIIERI, supra n.20, at 105 (discussing advantages
of arbitration as being more speedy and less expensive process); Roger S. Haydock,
Mediation and Arbitration fir Now and the Future, in TilE ARBrIRATION PROCESS, COMp. L.
Y.B. OF INr'L. Bus., SPECIAL ISSUE 2001 1, supra n.17, at 17 (mentioning speed and low
cost as advantages of arbitration); RiciIARD GARNETI ET AL., A PPACrICxL GUIDE 10 IN-
TERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 12-13 (2000) (noting arbitration is typically
faster and less expensive than litigation); GERALD AKIFN & ROVERT B. VON MEHREN,
INTERNATIONAL ARBFTRATIiON BETWEEN PRIVATE PARTIES AND GOVERNMENTS 56-58 (1982)
(noting parties typically see arbitration as cheaper and faster). But see Allen, supra, at 59
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mality and simplicity than litigation.25 Some of the major costs
of litigation may be reduced in arbitration due to the shorter
proceedings. 2' The length of the proceedings is generally much
more reasonable because the process is simplified,27 discovery is
limited, 28 and the expertise and experience of the arbitrator
reduces the need of expert witnesses to prove foundational con-
cepts in the field of the dispute. 9
Yet, not all commentators agree that arbitration is faster or
cheaper than litigation!"' Especially in longer and more compli-
cated arbitration cases between international corporations, time
or cost are rarely significantly reduced." Even so, arbitration in
(indicating arbitration can be longer and more expensive than litigation in longer and
more complicated cases); GARNETTr, supra, at 12-13 (noting arbitration may be longer
than court cases with sumnaryjudgment and may be more expensive when factoring
costs of arbitrators and resources of institution); AKSEN, sulra, at 56-59 (noting that
costs in complicated arbitration cases are comparable to that of litigation and may even
be greater).
25. See Allen, supra n.24, at 59 (noting that nature of arbitration process is less
formal and less involved than litigation). See also GARNETT, supra n.24, at 14 (indicating
that arbitration is typically simpler than traditional litigation).
26. See Fischer, supra n.17, at 36-41 (discussing major costs of litigation, such as
discovery, appeal, and lawyer expenses, that can be reduced by arbitrating). See also
Haydock, supra n.24, at 17 (indicating that costs of lawyers and discovery are reduced
under arbitration as compared with litigation); Allen, supra n.24, at 59 (noting that
arbitration process is generally shorter than litigation and therefore lawyer fees are
lower); GARNETT, supra n.24, at 12-13 (discussing lower costs in arbitration, compared
to litigation, due to lack of discovery).
27. See Haydock, supra n.24, at 17 (noting connection between length of proceed-
ings and simplicity of proceedings). See also Fischer, supra n.17, at 36-39 (indicating
that arbitral proceedings are typically shorter than litigation).
28. See Haydock, sulra n.24, at 17 (noting limited nature of discovery in most arbi-
trations). See also Fischer, supra n. 17, at 36-39, 59 (noting lack of strict rules of evidence
and procedure, but indicating that parties have ability to limit discovery and disclo-
sure).
29. See Allen, supra n.24, at 58 (indicating that having arbitrators who are experts
in subject area of dispute reduces necessity of presenting expert witnesses to "educate"
adjudicator on subject area). See also LoOKOFSKY, suna n.17, at 565 (observing arbitra-
tors are generally experts in several fields).
30. See Allen, supra n.24, at 59 (noting that more complex arbitrations are inclined
to be as long and as expensive as traditional litigation). See also GARNETr, supra n.24, at
12-13 (indicating that traditional litigation may be much less expensive in case of sLIm-
mary judgment); AKSEN, supra n.24, at 56-59 (indicating that in arbitration selecting
arbitrators and scheduling proceedings may create equivalent delays compared to that
of backed up courts and indicating attorneys fees would be roughly equivalent).
31. See AKSEN, supra n.24, at 56-59 (discussing arbitration becomes as expensive as
traditional litigation when dispute is complex and between large parties). See also Allen,
supra n.24, at 59 (noting it is not uncommon for international arbitration to go as long
as and cost as much as traditional litigation); GARNEr, supra n.24, at 12-13 (noting
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general is less expensive and more expedient.12
Aside from the relative cost and speed of arbitration, there
remain several other advantages that enter the minds of the par-
ties choosing to arbitrate." The parties are able to agree to vary
several different facets of the arbitral proceedings.3 4 The parties
can choose a neutral forum, selecting the forum that suits them
best."5 This choice may be based on fear of bias in the other
party's home forum or simply the convenience of a preferred
location."' The parties also have the ability to choose procedural
rules. 7 This allows the parties to choose rules that may be famil-
iar to both of them or even create a unique set of procedural
complex arbitrations are subject to high costs, making them comparable to traditional
litigation costs).
32. See Allen, supra n.24, at 59 (noting that in general arbitration remains faster
and cheaper than traditional litigation). See also GARNElT, supra n.24, at 12-13 (discuss-
ing that even though some complex cases will be as expensive or more expensive than
traditional litigation, normally arbitration is faster and cheaper); BAGHERI, supra n.20, at
105 (noting arbitration is generally cheaper than traditional litigation); Haydock, supra
n.24, at 17 (noting arbitration is usually faster and cheaper than traditional litigation).
33. See LOOKOFSKY, supra n.17, at 559-60 (noting advantages of arbitration include
flexibility of process and ability to adjust proceedings to personal needs). See also Allen,
supra n.24, at 57-59 (noting that arbitration also has advantage of customization of pro-
cess); BAGHERI, supra n.20, at 104-106 (arguing that one advantage of international arbi-
tration is party autonomy in tailoring proceedings); Haydock, supra n.24, at 17-19 (indi-
cating that arbitration has advantages of flexibility in proceedings); GARNETr, supra
n.24, at 13 (mentioning informality and confidentiality as advantages of arbitration over
litigation); ArKSEN, supra n.24, at 55-56 (noting that arbitration provides greater privacy
than litigation).
34. See Haydock, supra n.24, at 15-16 (discussing various choices parties may make
in arbitration, such as procedural rules, forum, or language of proceedings). See also
Allen, supra n.24, at 57 (noting flexibility of arbitration process in choice of arbitrators,
forum, and language of proceedings); GARNETr, supra n.24, at 13-14 (mentioning users
ability to individualize different facets of process); BAGHERi, supra n.20, at 105 (indicat-
ing that arbitration allows for individualization of process).
35. See Allen, supra n.24, at 57 (noting that parties may avoid procedural or sub-
stantive disadvantage by selecting neutral forum). See also BAC.HERI, supra n.20, at 105
(noting that parties may select neutral forum); GARNETr, supra n.24, at 13 (indicating
that parties have substantial control over where to arbitrate); ASEN, supra n.24, at 55
(noting parties can alleviate fears of bias by selecting neutral forum).
36. See AKSEN, supra n.24, at 55 (discussing parties' ability to reduce fear of bias
through selecting neutral forum). See also Allen, supra n.24, at 57 (indicating that neu-
tral forum may eliminate procedural or substantive disadvantages); GARNETT, supra
n.24, at 13 (noting parties are free to choose most convenient location); BAGHERI, sUpra
n.20, at 105 (mentioning parties' ability to select neutral forum).
37. See Haydock, supra n.24, at 17 (noting that arbitration allows parties to choose
between sets of procedural rules). See also GARNETr, supra n.24, at 13 (mentioning par-
ties' ability to select arbitral rules that govern proceedings); BAGHERI, supra n.20, at 105
(indicating that parties may choose procedural rules to apply to arbitration).
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rules that accommodate for their specific needs.38 Furthermore,
the parties select the language or languages of the proceed-
ings. 9 These various choices create powerful incentives for par-
ties seeking flexible rules for their specific needs to arbitrate
their disputes rather than pursue traditional litigation with its
more rigid rules.4 °
Scholars note that other advantages of arbitration include
the informality or lack of confrontation within the process,4' the
confidentiality of the proceedings,42 the expertise of the adjudi-
cators,43 and the enforceability of the award.44 Many parties seek
38. See BAGHERI, supra n.20, at 105 (discussing parties' freedom to mutually desig-
nate procedural rules). See also Haydock, supra n.24, at 17 (noting ability to choose
between sets of procedural rules); Allen, supra n.24, at 57 (discussing general flexibility
of arbitral proceedings); GARNE-rT, supra n.24, at 13 (noting parties' ability to modify
procedural rules).
39. See LOOKOFSKY, supra n.17, at 567 (stating that choice of language is important
factor depending on background of parties and their lawyers). See also GARNETr, supra
n.24, at 13 (noting that parties' ability to choose language of proceedings is advanta-
geous for all involved); AKSEN, supra n.24, at 56 (indicating that parties may choose
language or languages of proceedings).
40. See Allen, supra n.24, at 57-59 (explaining that arbitration is more flexible than
litigation and that many advantages arise out of this flexibility, such as choice of forum,
choice of language, and choice of procedural rules). See also GARNETr, supra n.24, at 11-
14 (noting that parties generally prefer arbitration when needing greater flexibility in
proceedings); Haydock, supra n.24, at 17 (noting that arbitration is attractive to parties
seeking flexibility in proceedings); BAGHERI, supra n.20, at 104-06 (describing choices
available in arbitration and that creating customized procedure meets specific needs of
parties); AKSEN, supra n.24, at 54-60 (arguing international parties need more flexibility
and therefore generally prefer arbitration); LooKoFsKY, supra n.17, at 561 (indicating
that flexibility is one major reason why arbitration is advantageous to some parties).
41. See Allen, supra n.24, at 58 (observing arbitration is less confrontational than
traditional litigation). See also GARNE-r, supra n.24, at 14 (noting arbitration is typically
much less formal than traditional litigation).
42. See Allen, supra n.24, at 57-58 (discussing increased confidentiality of arbitra-
tion proceedings as compared with traditional litigation). See also GARNEr, supra n.24,
at 14 (noting possibility for greater confidentiality in arbitral proceedings than in tradi-
tional litigation); BAGHERI, supra n.20, at 105 (noting confidentiality of arbitral proceed-
ings); AKSEN, supra n.24, at 55-56 (indicating that privacy in arbitral proceedings ex-
ceeds that of privacy in traditional litigation).
43. See Allen, supra n.24, at 58-59 (explaining arbitrators often are, and should be,
selected for their expertise). See also GARNETr, supra n.24, at 13 (noting that arbitrators
generally are both legal and non-legal experts); BAGHERI, supra n.20, at 105 (character-
izing arbitrators as qualified specialists); LOOKosKy, supra n.17, at 565 (noting that
arbitrators often possess legal expertise in several systems of national law); Haydock,
supra n.24, at 18 (noting that arbitrator is normally expert in area of dispute that they
are chosen to handle).
44. See Allen, supra n.24, at 58 (indicating ease of enforcement of arbitral awards).
See also LooKoFSvY, sulra n. 17, at 559-60 (noting worldwide enforcement in vast major-
ity of arbitration cases); Haydock, supra n.24, at 19 (noting wide recognition and en-
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a less invasive alternative to traditional litigation.4 The nature
of the process and confidentiality allow parties to reach an agree-
ment in a less confrontational and less public proceeding.4" Fur-
thermore, the expertise of the adjudicators gives parties confi-
dence in the decision, eases their financial and time burdens,
and allows for a more technical proceeding where needed.47 Fi-
nally, arbitration awards are nearly universally enforceable, mak-
ing it a very attractive alternative to litigation."
After deciding to arbitrate, a party then must decide
whether to arbitrate independently, in an ad hoc arbitration,4 9 or
through an arbitral institution, a body established to administer
arbitrations."' Proponents of institutional arbitration note that
forcement of arbitral awards); GARNETT, supra n.24, at 11-12 (discussing ease of enforce-
ment of arbitral awards under New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement
of Arbitral Awards). See generally id. at 101 (discussing enforceability of arbitral awards).
45. See Allen, supra n.24, at 58 (noting less publicity and less intensive scrutiny by
court in arbitration as compared to traditional litigation). See generally GARNETT, supra
n.24, at 14 (mentioning informality and confidentiality of arbitral proceedings).
46. See Allen, supra n.24, at 57-58 (discussing more amicable nature of arbitral pro-
ceedings as compared to traditional litigation). See also GARNETT, supra n.24, at 14 (dis-
cussing that informality grants parties larger measure of control in reaching agree-
ment); BAGHERI, supra n.20, at 105 (noting that arbitral proceedings are more confiden-
tial than traditional litigation); AKSEN, supra n.24, at 55-56 (noting that arbitration is
more private than traditional litigation).
47. See Allen, supra n.24, at 58-59 (discussing that more efficient proceedings gen-
erally occur when arbitrators are experts in field of dispute resulting in lower costs and
faster resolution of dispute). See also Haydock, supra n.24, at 18 (discussing that parties
are better assured that arbitrator understands applicable laws, customs and practices
involved in dispute when they are experts in field of dispute); GARNETr, supra n.24, at
13 (noting that when arbitrator is expert in field of dispute it is particularly beneficial to
proceedings); LOOKOFSKY, supra n.17, at 565 (noting that arbitrators often have exper-
tise in various legal systems).
48. See Allen, supra n.24, at 58 (noting that arbitral awards are often easier to en-
force than court decisions from other nations). See also LOOKOFSKY, supra n.17, at 559
(noting that most arbitral awards are enforceable in nearly every jurisdiction); GAR-
NEFT, supra n.24, at 11-12 (noting that enforcing arbitral awards is nearly universal
under New York Convention); Haydock, supra n.24, at 19, (discussing generally en-
forceability of arbitral awards).
49. See Allen, supra n.24, at 59 (defining ad hoc arbitration as one in which parties
themselves choose or create procedures and self-administer arbitral proceedings, al-
though often turning administration over to arbitrators, once chosen). See also GAR-
NEir, supra n.24, at 33-34 (discussing ad hoc arbitrations in general); LOOKOFSKv, suplra
n. 17, at 571-73 (discussing differences between ad hoc and institutional arbitral proceed-
ings).
50. See Allen, supra n.24, at 59 (discussing institutions that administer arbitration
proceedings, such as International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC), London Court of
International Arbitration ("LCIA"), or American Arbitration Association ("AAA"), and
indicating that institutions have rules that form procedural framework for arbitrations).
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some of the greatest benefits are in enforcement, foresight, and
government." An institutional arbitration award is more easily
enforced.52  The rules and procedures are more likely to pro-
duce consistent and predictable results, because of the institu-
tion's experience and assets, better anticipating unexpected and
diverse circumstances, and providing greater resources to facili-
tate the arbitration.5" An institution can better administer the
proceedings with its superior organization, control, and manage-
ment of the proceedings. 4
Proponents of ad hoc arbitration, on the other hand, ap-
plaud the lack of administrative fees.55 In ad hoc arbitration, the
parties are responsible for the administration of the proceed-
ings.56 Furthermore, ad hoc arbitration is less formal and more
flexible than institutional arbitration.5 7 Proponents of ad hoc ar-
See also GARNETT, supra n.24, at 33-34 (discussing institutionally administered arbitra-
tions); LoOKOESKY, supra n.17, at 571-73 (discussing differences between ad hoc and
institutional arbitrations).
51. See Allen, supra n.24, at 60 (noting that advantages of institutional arbitration
include ease of enforcement, institutions experience in arbitrating and thus greater
foresight in anticipating problems, and oversight of proceedings). See also GARNETr,
supra n.24, 33-34 (noting institutional arbitration awards are easy to enforce and that
institutions provide stncture for administering proceedings).
52. See Allen, supra n.24, at 60 (indicating that institutional arbitral awards are
more easily enforced than ad hoc arbitral awards typically because reputation of highly
regarded and well established institution makes it easier to seek enforcement than
awards from temporary unaffiliated ad hoc arbitral tribunals). See also LOOKOFSKY, supra
n.17, at 571-73 (explaining reputable institutions help enforcement of award).
53. See Allen, supra n.24, at 60 (discussing assets that help institutions provide bet-
ter arbitral proceedings and more satisfactory results). See also GARNETT, supra n.24, 33-
34 (comparing institutional arbitrations to ad hoc); Lookofsky, supra n.17, at 571-73
(discussing resources available in institutional arbitrations).
54. See Allen, supra n.24, at 60 (indicating that institutions can provide for more
efficient administration of arbitral proceedings than individuals on ad hoc basis and
thus produce more satisfactory results). See also LoOKOFSY, supra n.17, at 571-73 (not-
ing that, due to resources avilable to institutions, institutional arbitrations tend to pro-
ceed more efficiently).
55. See Allen, supra n.24, at 59 (noting that ad hoc arbitrations avoid fees that insti-
tutions charge for administering proceedings). See also LoOKOFSkv, supra n.17, at 573
(noting administrative charge for arbitrating through institution).
56. See Allen, supra n.24, at 59-60 (noting that parties exercise control over admin-
istration of proceedings). See also LooKoisKy, supra n.17, at 562-71 (discussing each
aspect of proceedings under ad hoc arbitration and parties' roles in administering pro-
ceedings).
57. See Allen, supra n.24, at 59-60 (noting that lower costs and greater flexibility are
two main advantages of ad hoc arbitration). But see LOOKOFSKY, supra n.17, at 571-73
(noting possibility of similar proceedings and results in ad hoc and institutional arbitra-
tions).
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bitrations note that parties, by exercising greater control over
the proceedings and better matching the proceedings to their
specific needs, should produce greater expediency and effi-
ciency.58 However, some scholars note, one drawback to ad hoc
arbitration is the lack of oversight over the arbitral tribunal and
the inability to effectively sanction the arbitrators for undue de-
lays or other disputes. '
B. The Function of Arbitration Rules
The rules of the various institutions or administrative bodies
serve to provide a framework within which to arbitrate the dis-
putes brought before them."' These rules are generally amenda-
ble by the parties to fit their specific needs." The rules will
likely contain several required provisions, covering numerous
matters such as the number of arbitrators or place of arbitra-
tion. 62 Experts note that because arbitration is a voluntary alter-
native to traditional litigation, a primary policy rationale behind
arbitration rules is to ensure client satisfaction, ensuring the pro-
cess remains an attractive alternative." Client satisfaction usu-
58. See Allen, supra n.24, at 59-60 (noting that supporters of ad hoc arbitration see
control over proceedings and greater flexibility of process as enabling parties to admin-
ister more efficient and expedient arbitral proceeding). See also LooKOFSKY, supra n.17,
at 559-60 n.4 (indicating that ICC arbitrations may move more slowly than ad hoc pro-
ceedings).
59. See Allen, supra n.24, at 60 (discussing difficulty of seeking recourse against
arbitrator during ad hoc proceedings). See also LOOKOFSKV, supra n.17, at 571-73 (noting
that institution can provide significant oversight role in proceedings).
60. See Michael F. Hoellering, The Institution's Role in Managing the Arbitration Pro-
cess, 1993-94 ARB. & L. 151, 152-53 (1994) [hereinafter Hoellering, The Institution's Role]
(noting institution's rules provide framework for arbitral proceedings and determine
extent to which institution is involved). See also Allen, supra n.24, at 60 (indicating that
institutions and their rules should serve to provide administrative and procedural sup-
port to arbitrations); GARNE-Tr, supra n.24, at 13 (discussing freedom to choose both
institution and rules that govern the proceedings).
61. See Allen, supra n.24, at 78-83 (discussing flexibility in arbitrating with institu-
tion and parties' ability to customize rules for their specific needs). See also Matthieu
Boisseson, The Arbitration Act 1996 and the New ICC Arbitration Rules 1998: A Comparative
Approach, 1(2) INT. A.L.R. 1998, 68-73, at 69, (discussing party autonomy under ICC and
noting that parties' freedom to agree on rules of procedure is subject only to certain
safeguards ensuring fair process).
62. See Fischer, supra n.17, at 48-49, 54-59 (indicating required provisions usually
include number of arbitrators or place of arbitration but noting parties may add nu-
merous other provisions, such as language of proceedings, choice of law and extent of
discovery and disclosure). See also Allen, supra n.24, at 78-83 (stating need for flexibility
in rules while offering framework to provide efficient procedure).
63. See Zylva, supra n.23, at 49 (arguing arbitral institutions, as service providers,
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ally encompasses the goals of low cost, speed and justice. 64
Although the rules are flexible, giving only a loose frame-
work within which the arbitrators have great discretion of how to
act,15 they still provide strict enough principles to ensure an effi-
cient and somewhat predictable process.66 Ultimately the rules
are used to guarantee an orderly resolution of the dispute.67 In
many ways, it makes no difference which institution you choose;
the institutions have enough flexibility to allow parties to fashion
the rules as needed or desired.6
Another purpose of arbitral institutions' rules is to tell par-
ties what kind of arbitration they can expect.69 The rules may
tell the parties how the institution selects its arbitrators, protects
the rights of the parties, or to what extent the institution is in-
volved in the administration of the arbitration y.7  Finally, the
should demonstrate to users that they will be treated fairly in order to continue as viable
option for resolving disputes). See also Robert Hunter, Anticipating Trends in Dispute
Resolution, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: DEVELOPING RULES FOR THE
NEW MILLENNIUM, supra n.23, at 15-16 (noting competition in dispute resolution and
necessity of providing predictable and just results).
64. See Fischer, supra n.17, at 36-41 (discussing that goals and advantages of arbi-
tration are typically low cost and quick and just resolution of dispute). See also Haydock,
supra n.24, at 17 (discussing advantages of arbitration as being faster and less expensive
than traditional litigation while remaining just); Allen, supra n.24, at 59 (comparing
advantages of arbitration and traditional litigation and noting that arbitration is usually
faster and less expensive than traditional litigation); GARNETr, supra n.24, at 12-13 (not-
ing that two major goals of arbitration are fast and inexpensive resolution of dispute).
65. See Hunter, supra n.63, at 15-16 (describing rules as framework within which
arbitrators may act with nearly complete discretion). See also Boisseson, supra n.61, at
69 (noting that institutional rules give flexibility to arbitrators in handling dispute yet
simultaneously provide requirements necessary for fair process).
66. See Marc Blessing, ICC Arbitral Tribunal Part III: The Procedure Before the Arbitral
Tribunal, in 3(2) ICC INT'L. CT. ARB. BULL. (1992), 18, 19 (indicating that institutional
riles provide sufficiently proper and due process). See also Allen, supra n.24, at 81 (stat-
ing that institutional rules offer structure to arbitration process).
67. See Allen, supra n.24, at 81 (stating that institutional rules provide framework
for orderly resolution of disputes). See also Blessing, supra n.66, at 19 (indicating that
institutional rules provide structure for organized solution to disputes).
68. See Allen, supra n.24, at 80-81 (discussing that similarity of institutional rules
and flexibility of rules makes choice of institution less important in many aspects). See
also Boisseson, supra n.61, at 69 (discussing that flexibility of institutional rules enables
parties to customize certain aspects of rules).
69. See Reziya Harrison, Conduct of the Arbitration - Rules fit for the Purpose, in INTER-
NATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: DEVELOPING RULES FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM,
supra n.23, at 94-95 (noting that institutional rules indicate type of arbitration to poten-
tial parties). See also Allen, supra n.24, at 61-77 (comparing goals and rules of ICC and
LCIA).
70. See Harrison, supra n.69, at 94-95 (indicating that institutional rules tell parties
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parties get the reputation of the institution, whether that is the
overall reliability of the institution or the quality of its arbitra-
tors.
71
C. Institutional Rules on Liability
Institutional rules often limit or exclude the institution's
own liability in performing its functions. 72  The International
Chamber of Commerce's ("ICC")7' Rules on Arbitration, under
article 34, clearly exclude the liability of the institution and its
employees in performing its functions.7 ' This rule broadly ex-
cludes liability for all acts and omissions relating to the arbitra-
tion.75
The London Court of International Arbitration ("LCIA") 76
Rules, under article 31.1, also exclude liability for all acts and
omission connected to the arbitration.77 Different from the ICC
how many arbitrators, how they are selected, how involved institution is in proceedings
and how parties may seek recourse for any alleged wrongdoings). See also Allen, supra
n.24, at 61-77 (comparing ICC rules with LCIA rules under categories, such as speed of
proceedings, and determining which set of rules better accomplishes goal of category).
7L See Allen, supra n.24, at 60 (noting that parties' awards bear institutions' repu-
tations). See also Fischer, supra n.17, at 51-52 (noting that institution's arbitrators may
have good reputation and institutions have advantage of day-to-day involvement with
qualified international arbitrators).
72. See Boisseson, supra n.61, at 69 (noting most institutional rules have exclusion
of liability clause). See also GARNE-Fr, supra n.24, at 197 (providing ICC's exclusion of
liability clause).
73. See International Chamber of Commerce: What is ICC?, at http://www.iccwbo.org/
home/menuwhatis_icc.asp (describing organization and activities). The ICC is an
organization dedicated to improving the world of business. Id. ICC activities range
from arbitration and dispute resolution to lobbying governments for open trade and
the market economy system to business self-regulation to fighting corruption or to com-
bating commercial crime. Id.
74. International Chamber of Commerce: Rules of Arbitration, art. 34, (Jan. 1,
1998), 36 I.L.M. 1604, at (1997) [hereinafter ICC Rules]. Article 34 states, "Exclusion
of Liability: Neither the arbitrators, nor the Court and its members, nor the ICC and its
employees, nor the ICC National Committees shall be liable to any person for any act or
omission in connection with the arbitration." Id.
75. See id. (noting that any act or omission in connection with arbitration is ex-
cluded from liability).
76. See LCIA: London Court of International Arbitration, at http://www.lcia-arbitra-
tion.com/ (last visited April 20, 2003) (introducing history and purpose of organization
and other information regarding organization). The London Court of International
Arbitration ("LCIA") is one of the largest providers of arbitration administration. 1I.
The LCIA also provides other forms of alternative dispute resolution. Id.
77. London Court of International Arbitration Rules, art. 31.1. (January 1, 1998),
at http://www.lcia-arbitration.com/Icia/arb/uk.htm [hereinafter LCIA Rules]. Article
31.1 states:
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though, the LCIA allows for liability for any deliberate wrongdo-
ing.78 The LCIA's provisions further state, in article 31.2, that
none of the same persons may be under any legal obligation to
testify regarding the arbitration once all possibilities of correc-
tion and appeal have elapsed.79 The American Arbitration Asso-
ciation's ("AAA") 8 ° International Arbitration Rules, under arti-
cle 35, exclude liability for all acts and omission connected to
the arbitration."1 Like the LCIA, the AAA includes an exception
for deliberate wrongdoing. 2
All three sets of rules clearly exclude liability for all acts and
omissions in connection with the arbitration, regardless of
whether or not they are judicial in function or administrative. 3
None of the LCIA, the LCIA Court (including its President, Vice-President
and individual members), the Registrar, any deputy Registrar, any arbitrator
and any expert to the Arbitral Tribunal shall be liable to any party howsoever
for any act or omission in connection with any arbitration conducted by refer-
ence to these Rules, save where the act or omission is shown by that party to
constitute conscious and deliberate wrongdoing committed by the body or
person alleged to be liable to that party.
Id.
78. See id. (stating that deliberate wrongdoing can lead to liability).
79. LCIA Rules, art. 31.2. Article 31.2 states:
After the award has been made and the possibilities of correction and addi-
tional awards referred to in Article 27 have lapsed or been exhausted, neither
the LCIA, the LCIA Court (including its President, Vice-Presidents and indi-
vidual members), the Registrar, any deputy Registrar, any arbitrator or expert
to the Arbitral Tribunal shall be under any legal obligation to make any state-
ment to any person about any matter concerning the arbitration, nor shall any
party seek to make any of these persons a witness in any legal or other pro-
ceedings arising out of the arbitration.
Id.
80. See American Arbitration Association: About Us, at http://www.adr.org/in-
dex2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15779 (describing organization). The AAA is one of the largest
providers of arbitration administration and other forms of dispute resolution. Id.
81. See American Arbitration Association, International Arbitration Rules, art. 35,
at http://www.adr.org/index2.1 .jsp?lSPssid= 15747&JSPsrc=upload\LIVESITE\Rules
-
Procedures\NationalInternational . .\ focus0Area\international\kAA175-1000.htm.
[hereinafter AAA International Arbitration Rules]. Article 35 states:
The members of the tribunal and the administrator shall not be liable to any
party for any act or omission in connection with any arbitration conducted
uinder these rules, except that they may be liable for the consequences of con-
scious and deliberate wrongdoing.
Id.
82. See id. (stating that conscious and deliberate wrongdoing may result in liabil-
ity).
83. See ICC Rules, supra n.74, art. 31 (excluding liability for all acts in connection
with arbitration); LCIA Rules, supra n.77, art. 31.1 (excluding all acts or omissions in
connection with arbitration from liability; AAA International Arbitration Rules, supra
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The LCIA and AAA, however, allow liability for any deliberate
wrongdoing, whereas the ICC does not speak to deliberate ac-
tions.84 These provisions provide a standard for liability when
arbitrating with each respective institution regardless of choice
of law provisions or forum."
II. DID YOU OVEREXTEND SOMETHING: DO ARBITRATORS
AND ARBITRAL INSTITUTIONS
ENJOY JUDICIAL IMMUNITY?
For the United States, England, and, though in a less direct
way, France, the immunity of arbitrators and arbitral institutions
developed out of each nation's approach to judicial immunity.86
n.81, art. 35 (excluding from liability any act or omission in connection with arbitra-
tion).
84. See LCIA Rules, supra n.77, art. 31.1 (excluding all acts and omissions in con-
nection with arbitration from liability except for deliberate wrongdoing). See also AAA
International Arbitration Rules, supra n.81, art. 35 (excluding liability for acts and omis-
sions in connection with arbitration except for conscious or intentional wrongdoing);
ICC Rules, supra n.74, art. 31 (excluding liability for all acts and omissions in connec-
tion with arbitration).
85. See Emmanuel Gaillard, International Arbitration Law: New Insight into the Duties
of Arbitral Institutions, 8/2/2001 N.Y.L.J. 3 (col. 1) (discussing that institutions' exclu-
sion of liability clauses create uniform standard of liability for institution regardless of
where arbitration takes place or suit against alleged wrongdoer takes place, but ques-
tioning whether clauses would be valid under national laws). See also FOUCHARD, GAIL-
LARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 602-03 (Emmanuel Gail-
lard &John Savage eds., 1999) [hereinafter FOUCHARD] (noting that exclusion of liabil-
ity clauses provide standard regarding liability regardless of where arbitration is taking
place and regardless of national laws regarding liability but questioning whether courts
would give force to such provisions). Different nations have differing views on liability
or immunity. Id. It is unlikely that institutional provisions excluding liability would be
valid either because arbitrations are generally considered contracts of adhesion or be-
cause of other public policy considerations. Id. This author is unaware of any case
where the institution was released from liability based on the institution's exclusion of
liability rule. See Gaillard, supra (noting that arbitral institutions' exclusion of liability
clauses have never been analyzed by courts).
86. See Julian M. D. Lew, Introduction, in THE IMMUNrrv OF ARBITRATORS 1, at 4
(Jutlian D. M. Lew ed., 1990) [hereinafter Lew, Introduction] (discussing generally posi-
tions of United States, England, and France with regard to arbitrator's immunity). See
also DavidJ. Branson & Richard E. Wallace,Jr., Immunity of Arbitrators under United States
Law, in THE: IMMUNrrY oF ARBITRATORS, supra, at 85-96 (discussing United States' basis
for immunity of arbitrators and arbitral institutions);Julian M. D. Lew, Immunity of Arbi-
trators under English Law, in THE IMMUNITY OF ARBITRATORS 21-27, supra, at 21 [hereinaf-
ter Lew, Immunity under English Law] (discussing England's basis for immunity of arbi-
trators and arbitral institutions);Jean-Louis Delvolv6, hnmunity of Arbitrators under French
Law, in THE IMMUNITY OF ARBITRATrORS 29-38, supra, at 29 (discussing France's basis for
immunity of arbitrators and arbitral institutions).
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The relationship between the arbitrator or the arbitral institu-
tion and the parties to the dispute greatly affects the basis for
immunity or liability.8 7 Viewing this relationship from a more
contractual nature, several commentators draw criticism to
granting arbitral institutions immunity.88
A. Differing Approaches to the Immunity of Arbitral Institutions
There are several approaches to arbitral immunity, varying
in different nations.89 This section will discuss three nations'
views on immunity and the basis for each view. 9° The nations
discussed will be the United States, England, and France, repre-
senting the nations where three of the largest arbitration institu-
tions are located: the AAA, the LCIA, and the ICC.9'
87. See FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 600-04 (discussing split in characterization of rela-
tionship between disputing parties and arbitrators and arbitral institutions). See also
Hon-Lin Yu & Eric Sauzier, From Arbitrator's Immunity to the Fifth Theory of International
Commercial Arbitration, 3(4) INT. A.L.R. 2000, 114-121 (discussing differing characteriza-
tions of relationship between disputing parties and arbitrators and arbitral institutions);
Julian Critchlow, The Source of Power: A Critical Appreciation of the Relationship of the Arbitra-
tor and the Parties, (Fenwick Elliot Articles and Papers 1997) at http://www.fenwick-elli-
ott.co.uk/public/articles/power.htm (discussing historical characterizations of rela-
tionship between disputing parties and arbitrators).
88. See Susan D. Franck, The Liability of International Arbitrators: A Comparative Analy-
sis and Proposal for Qualified Immunity, 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, at 28 (2000)
(arguing that institutions should not be permitted to disregard their own rules and
parties' agreement). See also Harrison, supra n.69, at 94-95 (noting that institutional
rules enable parties to anticipate type of arbitration); Mark A. Sponseller, Redefining
Arbitral Immunity: A Proposed Qualfied Immunity Statute for Arbitrators, 44 HASTINGS L.J.
421, at 439 (1993) (discussing that liability of institution for its own faults, as opposed to
arbitrators' failures, would protect judicial independence); FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at
603-04 (discussing institutional rules excluding liability, and questioning their validity);
Gaillard, supra n.85 (noting that validity of institutional rules excluding liability is of
great importance where state laws may allow for liability of institutions).
89. See Lew, Introduction, supra n.86, at 4 (discussing positions of United States,
England, and France with regard to arbitrator's immunity). See also Branson, supra
n.86, at 85-96 (discussing United States' basis for immunity of arbitrators and arbitral
institutions); Lew, Immunity under English Law, supra n.86, at 21-27 (discussing En-
gland's basis for immunity of arbitrators and arbitral institutions); Delvolv(, supra n.86,
at 29-38 (discussing France's basis for immunity of arbitrators and arbitral institutions).
90. See Lew, Introduction, supra n.86, at 4 (discussing immunity of arbitrators and
arbitral institutions in United States, England, and France). See also Branson, supra
n.86, at 85-96 (discussing United States' basis for immunity of arbitrators and arbitral
institutions); Lew, Immunity under English Law, supra n.86, at 21-27 (discussing immunity
of arbitrators and arbitral institutions in England); Delvolvi, supra n.86, at 29-38 (dis-
cussing France's position on immunity of arbitrators and arbitral institutions).
91. See International Chamber of Commerce: What is ICC?, supra n.73 (describing
ICC, headquartered in Paris, as one of the largest providers of arbitration administra-
tion). See LCIA: London Court of International Arbitration, supra n.76 (noting that
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1. United States
In the United States, arbitrators and arbitral institutions are
given an absolute immunity for all actions undertaken in fulfil-
ling their duties as arbitrators.1 This immunity is rooted in and
developed out of the concept of judicial immunity.'3  Thus, in
order to better understand immunity for arbitrators and institu-
tions, it is necessary to first understand the U.S. view on judicial
immunity.14
a. Immunity of Judges
Judges in the United States have enjoyed a nearly absolute
judicial immunity for more than 100 years."' The United States'
position finds its origins in two English cases."' The English
courts in the two cases clearly stated thatjudges are not liable for
their judicial acts, but each with a caveat. 7 The court in the
LCIA, headquartered in London, is one of largest providers of arbitration administra-
tion). See American Arbitration Association: About Us, supra n.80 (noting that AAA,
headquartered in New York, is one of largest providers of arbitration administration
and other forms of dispute resolution). See also Martin Odams de Zylva and Reziya
Harrison, Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: DEVELOPIN(; RULES
FOR IHE NEW MILLENNIUM, supra n.23, at xxv-xxxv [hereinafter Zylva and Harrison, In-
troduction] (discussing place of national laws in arbitration).
92. See Thomas Carbonneau, The UK Arbitration Act 1996, 8 WORLD ARB. & MEDIA-
TION REP. 187, at 191 (mentioning that United States' nearly absolute,judge-like immu-
nity is granted to arbitrators). See also Lew, Introduction, sulira n.86, at 4 (characterizing
immunity afforded to arbitrators in United States as absolute); Branson, supra n.86, 85-
96 (describing immunity to arbitrators in United States as extending to all actions tin-
dertaken in fulfilling their duties).
93. See Branson, supra n.86, at 85-88 (describing development of United States'
judicial immunity into arbitral immunity). See also Franck, supra n.88, at 16 (noting that
arbitral immunity in United States developed out of judicial immunity); Sponseller,
supra n.88, at 424-27 (indicating that arbitral immunity in United States is based on
concepts ofjudicial immunity).
94. See Branson, supra n.86, at 87 (noting that United States grants absolute immtL-
nity to judges). See also Franck, supra n.88, at 15 (noting that judicial immunity in
United States applies for all judicial acts); Sponseller, supra n.88, at 424 (discussing
judicial immunity in United States as extending to all judicial acts).
95. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1871) (holding judge absolutely immune
within judicial duties). See also Branson, supra n.86, at 87 (indicating judicial immunity
in United States has been upheld for more than 100 years); Sponseller, supra n.88, at
424-425 (indicating that idea ofjudicial immunity can be traced back nearly 400 years).
96. See Franck, supra n.88, at 16 (noting that judicial immunity in United States
originates from two English cases). See also Sponseller, supra n.88, at 424 (indicating
that United States' view on judicial immunity can be traced back to two English cases).
Seegenerally PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 1056-59 (W. Page Keeton et al.
eds., 5th ed. 1984) (discussing immunity of legislative and judicial officers).
97. See Marshalsea, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (K.B. 1612) (involving debtor who sued
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Marshalsea Case held that a judge acting in complete absence of
jurisdiction may be subject to personal liability." In Floyd, Lord
Coke held that a judge is immune from conspiracy charges for
any actions he takes in court as part of his functions as a justice
of peace, noting that the law will not admit any evidence against
the presumption that ajudge sworn to do justice would do injus-
tice." Even so, he later stated that this immunity does not apply
to "extrajudicial" acts."'(
These principles have been tested in the U.S. courts."' In
Bradley v. Fisher, the U.S. Supreme Court granted immunity to
federal judges."' The Court stated that a judge or judicial of-
ficer, in carrying out his judicial duties, must be free to act upon
his own convictions, without fear of reprisal by discontented par-
judge for ruling against him and holding judge immune so long as judge does not act
clearly outside jurisdiction). See also Floyd v. Barker, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1305 (K.B. 1607)
(involving criminal defendant who sued judge for conspiring against him and holding
judge not liable so long as acting in judicial capacity). See generally Franck, supra n.88, at
16 (notingjudges have immunity for judicial acts, and not for administrative, legislative,
or personal acts, so long as they did not act in complete absence of jurisdiction); Spon-
seller, supra n.88, at 425 (noting judges do not have liability for judicial acts when act-
ing outside jurisdiction).
98. See Marshalsea, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1027 (involving debtor who sued judge for rul-
ing against him, claimingjudge lacked subject matter jurisdiction). See also Michael R.
King, Judicial Immunity andJudicial Misconduct: A Proposal for Limited Liability, 20 ARiz. L.
REv. 549, 553 (1978) (discussing Marshalsea and noting thatjudicial immunity protects
judges who act within theirjurisdiction); Franck, supra n.88, at 16 (discussing thatjudi-
cial immunity applies to judges who act within theirjurisdiction as indicated in Marshal-
sea); Sponseller, supra n.88, at 425 (noting that Marshalsea established caveat forjudicial
immunity noting that judges who act clearly outside their jurisdiction may be held lia-
ble).
99. See Iloyd, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1305 (involving criminal defendant who sued judge
for conspiring against him because judge would not hear his arguments and holding
that judges are immune for what they do judicially). See also Franck, supra n.88, at 16
(discussing F/oyd and noting that for efficient administration of justice, judges cannot
be held liable for their judicial functions); Sponseller, supra n. 88, at 424-25 (noting
that Floyd confirms judicial immunity for judicial acts).
100. See Floyd, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1305 (holding English law will not admit any proof
against judges for anything they do in fulfilling their judicial functions). See also Franck,
su/na n.88, at 16 (noting that non-judicial acts may lead to liability); Sponseller, supra
n.88, at 424-25 (noting that when judges' acts are administrative, legislative, or per-
sonal, immunity is precluded).
101. See Franck, supra n.88, at 16-17 (noting that United States reflects same excep-
tions to judicial immunity as found in English cases: outside of jurisdiction and non-
judicial or administrative acts). See also Sponseller, supra n.88, at 424-25 (noting that
U.S. Supreme Court upheld these exceptions).
102. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 346-47 (1871) (holding that judge cannot
be subjected to liability for decision however erroneous act may have been, and how-
ever damaging it was to plaintiff).
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ties.' The U.S. Supreme Court granted this immunity again in
Pierson v. Ray.'" 4 The Court, in reaching its holdings, outlined
the policy for protecting the integrity of judges' decisions and
emphasized the availability of alternate means of ensuring jus-
tice, namely impeachment and the possibility of appeal." 5
Even though judicial immunity is considered absolute in the
United States, courts have allowed parties to sue judges in cer-
tain narrow circumstances.'..' Where judges have acted with a
complete lack of jurisdiction, parties have been able to sue for
malicious prosecution and abuse of process." 7 Also, judges are
not immune for non-judicial acts that are administrative or min-
isterial in nature." 8 In sum, judicial immunity in the United
States is absolute for all judicial acts, unless performed clearly
outside the bounds of the court's jurisdiction over the dispute.""'
103. See id. at 347 (noting that judge's freedom to act upon his own convictions,
without fear of reprisal, was principle of highest importance).
104. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (holding thatjudges are not liable for
what they dojudicially in case concerningjudge who convicted civil rights protestors for
their actions at bus station in Jackson, Mississippi).
105. See Bradley, 80 U.S. at 350 (focusing on alternatives of impeachment, suspen-
sion or removal from office in holding forjudicial immunity). See also Pierson, 386 U.S.
at 554 (focusing on availability of appeal in justifying holding of immunity). See gener-
ally Lew, Immunity under English Law, supra n.86, at 21 (noting that English law supports
judicial immunity in part because of availability of impeachment and appeal).
106. See Franck, supra n.88, at 17 (noting that exceptions to judicial immunity in-
clude when judges act in function not normally performed byjudges and acting outside
of jurisdiction). See also Sponseller, supra n.88, at 426 (statingjudicial immunity has two
exceptions: acts clearly outsidejurisdiction and ministerial or administrative acts); King,
supra n.98, at 571-76 (explaining that non-judicial acts and acts outside jurisdiction are
not protected under judicial immunity).
107. See King, supra n.98, at 576 (noting that judges can be civilly liable for acts
completely outside jurisdiction). See also Sponseller, supra n.88, at 426 (indicating that
private remedies are available when judges act with complete lack ofjurisdiction).
108. See Sponseller, supra n.88, at 426 (indicating acts considered administrative or
ministerial do not enjoy immunity); King, supra n.98, at 576-77 (noting non-judicial acts
performed by judges do not enjoy immunity). The U.S. Supreme Court held that im-
partial jury selection was administrative and therefore there was no judicial immunity
for such acts. Ex parte Commonwealth of Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 348 (1879). The
Supreme Court also held that a judge's hiring and firing decisions are administrative
and without immunity. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229-30 (1988). The Supreme
Court stated that immunity comes from the judicial process itself rather than the posi-
tion. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978).
109. See Lew, Introduction, at 4 (characterizing immunity in United States as abso-
lute). See also Sponseller, supra n.88, at 425-426 (noting that judges have absolute im-
munity when acting judicially, within their jurisdiction); Franck, supra n.88, at 16-17
(indicating that judges enjoy judicial immunity for all judicial acts done within jurisdic-
tion); Michael F. Hoellering, Immunity from Liability, 1991-92 ARB. & L. 41, 42 (1992)
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b. Immunity of Arbitrators
In the United States, arbitrators have immunity for all ac-
tions undertaken in the fulfillment of their duties.11 Cases dat-
ing back to the late 1800s extend judicial immunity to arbitra-
tors. " Courts based arbitral immunity on the quasi-judicial
functions arbitrators serve.' 12  U.S. courts granted immunity to
arbitrators because they were concerned with protecting the in-
tegrity of their decisions, noting the functional similarity of arbi-
trators to judges.' '" If immunity is necessary to protect the deci-
sions of judges, freeing them from concern for liability, then the
same logic applies to the decisions of arbitrators.' 4
[hereinafter Hoellering, Immunity] (explaining that judges enjoy absolute immunity for
performance of judicial acts unless performed in clear absence of jurisdiction).
110. See Branson, supra n.86, at 85 (characterizing arbitral immunity in United
States as absolute). See also Franck, supra n.88, at 19 (noting in United States arbitrators
acting in quasi-judicial capacity have immunity); Hoellering, Immunity, supra n. 109, at
43 (noting arbitrators, like judges, enjoy immunity in United States); Lew, Introduction,
supra n.86, at 4 (characterizing United States' position with regard to arbitral immunity
as strongest of all nations); Sponseller, supra n.88, at 427-35 (noting arbitrators enjoy
absolute immunity in United States for acts in fulfilling duties). See generally Dennis R.
Nolan & Roger 1. Abrams, Arbitral Immunity, 11 INDUS. REL. L.J. 228, at 238 (1989) (dis-
cussing absolute nature of arbitrators' immunity in United States).
111. See Hoosac Tunnel Dock & Elevator Co. v. O'Brien, 137 Mass. 424 (1884)
(holding arbitrator not liable where arbitrator and one party conspired against other
party for unjust award). See alsoJones v. Brown, 6 N.W. 140 (Iowa 1880) (holding that
arbitrator is immune from liability for judicial acts where one party alleged conspiracy
to defraud by ruling before all evidence was presented); Branson, supra n.86, at 87
(noting that cases upholding arbitral immunity date back more than 100'years); Hoel-
lering, Immunity, supra n.109, at 42-43 (discussing decisions upholding immunity of ar-
bitrators from 1800s); Sponseller, supra n.88, at 427-28 (discussing Jones as one early
example of immunity for arbitrators).
112. See Franck, supra n.88, at 19 (indicating that courts analogized arbitrators'
functions to that ofjudges and thus extended immunity to them under similar justifica-
tions). See also Branson, supra n.86, at 87 (discussing similarity between arbitrators'
functions and that ofjudges); Hoellering, Immunity, supra n.109, at 42-43 (noting courts
extended immunity to arbitrators due to theirjudicial function); Sponseller, supra n.88,
at 428 (discussing similarity of functions of arbitrators and judges and noting courts'
extension of immunity to arbitrators based on this similarity).
113. See Branson, supra n.86, at 87 (noting that courts pointed to functional com-
parability in extending immunity to arbitrators). See also Franck, supra n.88, at 18-19
(indicating that courts extended immunity to arbitrators based on their functional com-
parability tojudges); Nolan, supra n.ll0, at 238 (noting that both judges and arbitrators
are required to adjudicate disputes and therefore both perform judicial functions).
114. See Branson, supra n.86, at 87 (noting need to protect decisional integrity of
arbitrators). See also FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 592-93 (indicating that courts were con-
cerned with decisional autonomy of arbitrators); Hoellering, Immunity, supra n.109, at
43 (discussing need for arbitrators to be free from concern of liability in reaching deci-
sions).
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More recently, the courts have reinforced and even sug-
gested expanding the idea of arbitral immunity.'" ' The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that immunity is essential in
order to protect arbitrators, as decision-makers, from improper
influence and protect the integrity of awards from dissatisfied
parties.'' The Sixth Circuit makes this position stronger, stating
that the policy of protecting arbitrators should not only be up-
held but, if need be, expanded." 7
Another justification for granting arbitrators immunity is
that many arbitrators are professionals in a field and choose to
arbitrate disputes in addition to their primary career. '" Without
immunity, it is argued, there would be a disincentive for arbitra-
tors to serve.' "' As arbitration grows, '2 the more damaging it
would be for individuals to not serve as arbitrators out of fear of
liability.'' Every U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals that has ad-
115. See Branson, supra n.86, at 86 (noting cases reinforcing policy of extending
arbitral immunity). See also Franck, supra n.88, at 18-20 (citing recent cases upholding
arbitra immunity in carrying out arbitral duties).
116. See Wasyl, Inc. v. First Boston Corp., 813 F. 2d 1579, 1582 (9th Cir. 1987)
(strengthening arbitral immunity and justifying position with federal policy favoring
arbitration). See also Corey v. New York Stock Exchange, 691 F. 2d 1205, 1211 (6th Cir.
1982) (upholding arbitral immunity). See generally Branson, supra n.86, at 86 (discuss-
ing recent cases fortifying immunity granted to arbitrators and noting courts often cite
federal policy favoring arbitration as reason to protect process).
117. See Int'l Union v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. 701 F. 2d 1181, 1186 (1983) (sug-
gesting that it is appropriate to expand immunity granted to arbitrators, if necessary).
See generally Branson, supra n.86, at 86 (discussing cases reinforcing immunity to arbitra-
tors).
118. See Branson, supra n.86, at 87-88 (mentioning that arbitrators typically have
other careers and arbitrate only part-time). But see Sponseller, supra n.88, at 438-39
(noting growing number of professional arbitrators over part-time arbitrators as popu-
larity of arbitration increases).
119. See Tamari v. Conrad, 552 F.2d 778, 781 (7th Cir. 1977) (arguing that arbitra-
tors would be less likely to serve if not immune and federal policy favoring arbitration
therefore encourages immunity). See aLso Branson, supra n.86, at 87-88 (asserting that
burden on arbitrators to defend themselves from personal attacks would act as disincen-
tive to serve as arbitrators). But see Sponseller, supra n.88, at 438-439 (noting that there
are other professions where personal liability does not act as disincentive to practice
career, but rather creates incentive to practice career in cautious and reasonable man-
ner).
120. See Hoellering, The Institution's Role, supra n.60, at 151 (noting arbitration's
rapid growth recently). See also BAGHERI, s na n.20, at 106 (discussing increasing popu-
larity of arbitration); LOOKOFSKV, supra n.17, at 559; Fischer, supra n. 20, at 31-32 (indi-
cating growth of arbitration as dispute resolution method).
121. See Branson, supra n.86, at 87-88 (noting arbitrators may not serve out of fear
of liability). But see Sponseller, supra n.88, at 438-39 (discussing other professions
where there is liability and yet professions continue to thrive). One scholar discusses
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dressed the issue of liability has extended absolute immunity to
arbitrators for all acts performed in their arbitral capacity. 1 22
c. Immunity of Arbitral Institutions
The question remains as to the United States' position on
the immunity of institutions that administer or sponsor arbitra-
tions.'12' Arbitral immunity generally protects persons who per-
form quasi-judicial functions. 124 In Ruberstein v. Otterbourg,125 the
Civil Court of the City of New York granted immunity to the
AAA, holding that the same immunity that protects arbitrators
should be extended to arbitral institutions because they are
quasijudicial organizations and immunity is increasingly being
extended to them. 26
Commentators note that Austern 127 represents a clear view
the affects of liability on institutions, supporting liability because the institutions will
remain profitable and the costs passed on to the clients will be minimal, if any. Id. at
439.
122. See Wasyl, 813 F.2d at 1582 (holding that case law establishes that arbitrators
are immune from civil liability for all acts within their jurisdiction arising out of their
arbitral functions). See also Tamari, 552 F.2d at 780 (holding that arbitral immunity
should be extended to cases where authority of arbitrator to resolve dispute is chal-
lenged); Calm v. Int'l Ladies' Garment Union, 311 F.2d 113, 114-15 (3d Cir. 1962) (per
curiam) (holding that arbitrator acting in his capacity as arbitrator was performing
quasi-judicial duties and therefore was clothed with immunity). See generally Lew, Intro-
duction, supra n.86, at 4 (indicating that U.S. courts grant absolute immunity for arbitra-
tors when acting within duties); Branson, supra n.86, at 85 (discussing immunity for
arbitrators in United States and noting when arbitrators are performing their arbitral
duties U.S. courts have granted absolute immunity).
123. See Hoellering, Immunity, supra n.109, at 41-49 (discussing extension of arbi-
tral immunity to institutions). See also Branson, supra n.86, at 85-96 (indicating that
courts have extended immunity to institutions that sponsor arbitrations).
124. See Branson, supra n.86, at 88-96 (noting that arbitral immunity is granted to
persons acting in quasi-judicial function as arbitrator). See also Nolan, supra n. 110, at
23940 (indicating that arbitrators enjoy immunity because of quasi-judicial function);
Michael F. Hoellering, The Role o'the International Arbitrator, 51-Sep Disp. RESOL. J. 100,
106, (1996) [hereinafter Hoellering, Arbitrator] (referring to quasi-judicial role and
functional comparability); Hoellering, Immunity, supra n.109, at 43-46, (discussing arbi-
trators' functional comparability to judges); Franck, supra n.88, at 19, (discussing im-
munity applying to arbitrators due to their functional comparability to judges).
125. See Ruberstein v. Otterbourg, 357 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1973) (involving party who
sued AAA for failing to intervene and disqualify arbitrator).
126. See Ruberstein, 357 NY.S.2d at 64 (noting that there is expanding umbrella of
protection being granted to arbitral institutions).
127. See Austern, 898 F.2d 882 (involving immunity granted to CBOE as sponsoring
organization of arbitration where party sued CBOE for negligently impaneling arbitral
tribunal and failing to provide notice).
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of absolute institutional immunity in the United States.1 8 The
Austerns sued the arbitral institution directly for what they
claimed were administrative aspects of the institution's duties. 29
However, the court refused to allow liability, holding that ex-
tending the immunity granted to arbitrators to institutions that
administer arbitration proceedings is necessary to protect the
policies underlying arbitral immunity; otherwise, the immunity
granted to arbitrators would be an illusion.'"" The court based
its decision solely on the doctrine of arbitral immunity,'3 1 noting
the contractual nature of the arbitration but relying on the func-
tional comparability of the arbitrator's role to that of a judge.1'3 2
The court dismissed the argument that the acts complained of
were administrative, stating that they were adequately associated
with the judicial phase of the proceedings to justify immunity.'
Another case involving an attack on an institution sponsor-
ing an arbitration was Corey v. New York Stock Exchange.' 4 The
plaintiff sued the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") claiming
128. See JACOMIIN J. VAN HOF, COMMENTARY ON THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION
RULES: THE APPLICATION BY [HE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 46 (1991) (noting that Aus-
tern case represents United States' extension of absolute immunity to arbitral institu-
tions). See also Hoellering, Arbitrator, supra n. 124, at 106 (indicating that arbitral institu-
tions have been granted absolute immunity, citing Austern case); Robert H. Smit &
NicholasJ. Shaw, 8 Am. REV. INT'L ARB. 275, at 322-23 (1997) (noting that arbitral insti-
tutions enjoy absolute immunity in United States, citing Austern case).
129. See Austern, 898 F.2d at 884, 886 (arguing that failure to serve notice and
improper selection of arbitration panel were administrative or ministerial functions).
130. See Austern, 898 F.2d at 886 (reasoning that extending arbitral immunity to
arbitral institutions is necessary to protectjudicial independence and citing federal pol-
icies favoring arbitration). See also Hoellering, Immunity, supra n.109, at 45 (noting that
court held arbitral immunity without institutional immunity would merely shift liability
to sponsoring institutions).
131. See Austern, 898 F.2d at 887 (citing arbitral immunity as absolute and encom-
passing institutions that administer arbitrations). See also Hoellering, Immunity, supra
n.109, at 45 (indicating that court based immunity of institution on policies behind
arbitral immunity).
132. See Austern, 898 F.2d at 886 (discussing similarity in arbitrator's role to that of
judges and then extending this to sponsoring institutions). See also Hoellering, Immu-
nity, supra n.109, at 44-45 (discussing that arbitral immunity is based on quasi-judicial
role of arbitrator and noting that court extended arbitral immunity to institutions in
order to protect arbitrator).
133. See Austern, 898 F.2d at 886 (holding that all acts integrally related to process
are protected and holding that selection of panel was sufficiently connected to adjudi-
cative phase and therefore dismissing Austerns' challenge as merely semantic character-
ization).
134. See Corey, 691 F.2d at 1205 (involving plaintiff who sued New York Stock Ex-
change ("NYSE") for improperly impaneling tribunal).
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that the composition of the tribunal was violative of the NYSE
rules and alleging other procedural irregularities. 135 The court
dismissed the claim as an impermissible collateral attack on the
arbitrators' award. 3" Even though the plaintiff sued the NYSE
and not the individual arbitrators and stated procedural viola-
tions for which the NYSE was responsible, the court held that
arbitral immunity must be extended to arbitral institutions; not-
ing that otherwise, the immunity extended to arbitrators would
be an illusion.13 7 The court further held that the Federal Arbi-
tration Act ("the U.S. Act")' was the exclusive remedy for the
plaintiff." '9 Even though the U.S. Act does not mention the lia-
bility or immunity of arbitrators or arbitral institutions, the court
held that this possibility is excluded because the Act provides the
exclusive remedy for all claims against an arbitration award. 4 °
135. See id. at 1208 (noting that plaintiff sued claiming that irregularities pre-
vented his presenting evidence, caused hearings to be postponed despite his objection
and allowed panel to control proceedings with purpose of thwarting his claims).
136. See id. at 1207 (reasoning that extension of immunity to institution is neces-
sary protect underlying principles of arbitral immunity). See also Branson, supra n.86, at
92 (discussing holding in Corey and noting that test of whether functions are quasi-
judicial is liberal).
137. See Corey, 691 F.2d at 1211 (stating this would amount to merely shifting liabil-
ity from arbitrators to sponsoring associations).
138. Federal Arbitration Act 1947, 9 U.S.C. Ch. 1.
139. See Corey, 691 F.2d at 1211-12 (noting that sections 10, 11 and 12 of Arbitra-
tion Act provide for judicial review of award).
140. See id. at 1211 (noting that arbitral immunity and arbitral institutional immu-
nity are necessary for arbitration and that Federal Arbitration Act provides only remedy
for all claims against arbitral awards). See also Fedeial Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Ch. I
sec. 10. Section 10 states:
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district
wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the
application of any party to the arbitration
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or ei-
ther of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence per-
tinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which
the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submit-
ted was not made.
[(5) Redesignated (b)]
(b) If an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required
the award to be made has not expired, the court may, in its discretion, direct a
rehearing by the arbitrators.
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Although there is no statutory basis for the immunity of ar-
bitral institutions, the case law clearly extends judicial immunity
to arbitrators and those who sponsor arbitrations."' This immu-
nity would appear to cover all acts that touch the arbitration pro-
ceedings, protecting the integrity and independence of the judi-
cial process rather than the individual.142  Commentators con-
(c) The United States district court for the district wherein an award was made
that was issued pursuant to section 580 of title 5 may make an order vacating
the award upon the application of a person, other than a party to the arbitra-
tion, who is adversely affected or aggrieved by the award, if the use of arbitra-
tion or the award is clearly inconsistent with the factors set forth in section 572
of title 5.
Id.
141. Id. See also Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Ch. 1 sec. 11. Section 11 states:
In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the district
wherein the award was made may make an order modifying or correcting the
award upon the application of any party to the arbitration
(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evi-
dent material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property re-
ferred to in the award.
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them,
unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter
submitted.
(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of
the controversy.
The order may modify and correct the award, so as to effect the intent thereof
and promote justice between the parties.
Id. See also Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Ch. I sec. 12. Section 12 states:
Notice of a motion to vacate, modify, or correct an award must be served upon
the adverse party or his attorney within three months after the award is filed or
delivered. If the adverse party is a resident of the district within which the
award was made, such service shall be made upon the adverse party or his
attorney as prescribed by law for service of notice of motion in an action in the
same court. If the adverse party shall be a nonresident then the notice of the
application shall be served by the marshal of any district within which the ad-
verse party may be found in like manner as other process of the court. For the
purposes of the motion any judge who might make an order to stay the pro-
ceedings in an action brought in the same court may make an order, to be
served with the notice of motion, staying the proceedings of the adverse party
to enforce the award.
Id.
See VAN HoF, supra n.128, at 46 (noting that arbitral institutions are protected by same
immunity as arbitrators). See also FOUC;HARD, supra n.85, at 594 (indicating that United
State's case law extends immunity to arbitral institutions); Hoellering, Immunity, supra
n.109, at 45, 49 (stating that United States has extended imnmunity to include agencies
sponsoring arbitration).
142. See FoUCHARD, sufpra n.85, at 592-93 (noting case law dating back to 1884 ex-
cluding all civil liability for arbitrators with respect to acts committed in that capacity).
See also VAN HoF, supra n.128, at 46 (indicating that immunity extends to both arbitra-
tors and institutions for their quasi-judicial activities); Hoellering, Immunity, supra
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sider the protection afforded arbitrators in the United States as
the most heightened of any nation.14
2. England
Commentators agree that the English position on arbitral
immunity, although similar to the United States position, is qual-
ified.' 4 4 The position, which recently has been codified in the
Arbitration Act 1996 ("U.K. Act"), 4 ' developed through the
common law, out of the English perspective on judicial immu-
nity. "' Judicial immunity was traditionally applied to arbitrators
until two cases brought this immunity under question. 47 Soon
thereafter, the U.K. Act clarified the English position on both
arbitral immunity and arbitral institutional immunity. 4 '
n.109, at 44-45, 49 (noting necessary proceedings administered by arbitral institutions
such as choosing arbitrators or application of rules have all been protected with immu-
nity).
143. See Branson, supra n.86, at 85 (characterizing arbitral immunity in United
States as absolute). See also Franck, supra n.88, at 19 (noting that arbitrators in United
States enjoy absolute immunity in fulfilling duties); Hoellering, Immunity, supra n.109,
at 43 (noting that arbitrators, like judges, enjoy absolute immunity in United States);
Lew, Introduction, supra n.86, at 4 (characterizing United States' position with regard to
arbitral immunity as absolute); Nolan, supra n.109, at 238 (discussing absolute nature of
arbitrators' immunity in United States); Sponseller, supra n.88, at 427-35 (noting that,
in United States, arbitrators enjoy absolute immunity in performing their arbitral du-
ties).
144. See Lew, Introduction, supra n.86, at 4 (characterizing English position on arbi-
tral immunity as qualified immunity). See also FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 592 (noting
that arbitral immunity in England is limited). However, one commentator notes that
England, like the United States, extended immunity to arbitral institutions. Id. at 594.
See also Franck, supra n.88, at 17 (noting similarity of.judicial immunity in common law
countries).
145. Arbitration Act 1996 Ch. 23 (Eng.). The preamble states, "[a]n Act to restate
and improve the law relating to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement; to
make other provision relating to arbitration and arbitration awards; and for connected
purposes." Id.
146. See Lew, Immunity under English Law, supra n.86, at 21 (discussing develop-
ment of arbitral immunity in England). See also Franck, supra n.88, at 17-21 (discussing
English judicial immunity and perspective on arbitral immunity).
147. See Sutcliffe v. Thackrah, [1974] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 318 (holding that although
arbitrators enjoyed immunity, architect who, in arbitrating dispute, did not rely on par-
ties for argument and evidence in issuing decision but rather, conducted his own inves-
tigation, was not arbitrator and therefore not entitled to immunity). See also Arenson v.
Arenson, [1976] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 179 (holding that, even though arbitrators enjoyed im-
munity, auditors were merely valuers in case and not arbitrators here and therefore did
not extend immunity to them); Lew, Immunity under English Law, supra n.86, at 21 (stat-
ing that English position treated arbitrators akin to judges and thus extended them
immunity, noting, however, that this was questioned in two cases: Sutcliffe and Arenson).
148. See 1996 Ch. 23 sec. 29 (granting arbitrators immunity for all actions in fulfil-
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a. Immunity of Judges
In English law there is complete immunity for judges acting
in their 'judicial capacity."' 14" Lord Tenterden, C.J., in the often
quoted case, Garnett v. Ferrand,1511 clearly stated judges are im-
mune from suit in carrying out their judicial duties.15"' Although
Lord Tenterden was referring to a judge, he used broad lan-
guage allowing arbitrators to be included in this protection. 52
There are several other cases that assert this theme of judi-
cial immunity in England. 153  As early as 1697, in Sir Richard
Raine's Case,15 4 the court noted that, although there is the possi-
bility of an appeal, the judge was not liable, because he was act-
ing in his role as a judge within proper subject matter jurisdic-
tion. 1 55 In 1861, the well-established rule was stated in Kemp v.
Neville that a judge could not be sued for an adjudication within
proper subject matter jurisdiction.156
ling arbitral duties). See also 1996 Ch. 23 sec. 74 (extending immunity to institutions
sponsoring arbitrations). See generally FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 593-94 (noting that Ar-
bitration Act 1996 ("U.K. Act") grants arbitrators and arbitral institutions immunity).
149. See Lew, Immunity under English Law, supra n.86, at 21 (noting that judges in
England enjoy complete immunity for judicial functions). See also LordJustice Brooke,
Judicial Independence - Its History in England and Wales, Fragile Bastion Papers, at http://
www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/FB/fbbrook.htm (noting historical roots of judicial immunity
in England); Critchlow, supra n.87 (discussing foundations ofjudicial immunity in En-
gland).
150. See Garnett v. Ferrand, 153 E.R. 577 (1827) (involving plaintiff who sued
judge for assault where plaintiff entered room during inquisition and refused to exit
upon request and thereupon, judge and officer of court removed plaintiff from room).
151. See id. at 581 (stating that this immunity from suit of individual is given to
judges, not so much for their own sake as for sake of public, and for advancement of
justice, enabling judges to be independent, as all who are to administerjustice ought to
be).
152. See id. at 581 (stating that all who are to administer justice enjoy this immu-
nity). See also Critchlow, supra n.87 (noting that language in Garnett extending immu-
nity to judges equally applies to arbitrators).
153. See Sir Richard Raine's Case 91 E.R. 1071 (1697) (supporting unquestioned
principle of judicial immunity in English law). See also Kemp v. Neville 142 E.R. 556
(1861) (holding that no action lies against judges for what they do in fulfilling their
duties).
154. See Sir Richard Raines Case, 91 E.R. at 1071 (involving plaintiff seeking to com-
pel judge to grant administration of will, where court held that judge was only proper
judge to determine validity of will so court will not compel him and if he does not find
will valid, no action can lie against him).
155. See id. at 1071 (stating that judge cannot be sued for what he does judicially).
156. See Kemp, 142 E.R. at 556 (holding that no action lies againstjudges for what
they do in fulfilling their judicial duties and stating "a judicial officer is not liable to be
sued for an adjudication according to the best of his judgment upon a matter within his
jurisdiction").
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There are two cases that establish the narrow points at
which a judge would be liable for his actions.1"7 In Marshalsea,
the court held that a judge is liable for acts outside of his juris-
diction.1"' In Floyd, Lord Coke held that a judge is liable for
"extrajudicial" acts. 15,9
In sum, English law clearly states that judges acting in their
judicial capacity are immune from all liability."O° This was justi-
fied, in part, because the disappointed party could seek appeal,
and the judge could be punished criminally for any corruption
on his part. 6 ' As in the United States, 62 the reasoning is that
judges must be free to decide cases without fear of reprisal by
157. See Marshalsea, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1027 (stating that liability may lie ifjudges act
clearly outside their jurisdiction); loyd, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1305 (stating that judges may
be liable when they are not performing judicial function).
158. See Marshalsea, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1027 (stating that judges may be liable when
acting in complete absence of jurisdiction). See also Franck, supra n.88, at 16 (noting
that Marshalsea held that acts done completely outside jurisdiction open judges to possi-
bility of liability).
159. See Floyd, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1305 (stating that judges may be liable for adminis-
trative or ministerial acts). See also Sponseller, supra n.88, at 425 (noting that judicial
immunity has 'Judicial acts" limit, precluding immunity when judges' acts are non-judi-
cial).
160. See ALFRED DENNING, THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW 64, (Buttersworth 1980).
Lord Denning well summarized the English position on judicial immunity:
Ever since the year 1613, if not before, it has been accepted in our law that no
action is maintainable against ajudge for anything said or done by him in the
exercise of ajurisdiction which belongs to him. The words which he speaks are
protected by an absolute privilege. The orders which he gives and the
sentences which he imposes, cannot be made the subject of civil proceedings
against him. No matter that the judge was under some gross error or igno-
rance, or was actuated by envy, hatred and malice, and all uncharitableness,
he is not liable to an action ...
Id. See also Marshalsea, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1027 (holding thatjudge is immune from suit so
long as not acting completely outside jurisdiction); Floyd, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1305 (holding
that judge is immune for any act carried out in performing judicial function); Lew,
Immunity under English Law, supra n.86, at 21 (stating that English law grants immunity
to judges for performance of their judicial functions).
161. See Marshalsea, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1027 (noting that party had remedy of appeal
available despite not being able to sue judge directly). See also loyd, 77 Eng. Rep. at
1305 (stating that judge may be criminally liable for corruption, but not civilly liable);
Lew, Immunity under English Law, supra n.86, at 21 (discussing that although judges are
immune from private action, they are subject to impeachment and their decisions are
subject to review of higher courts).
162. See Bradley, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (stating that judges must be free to act upon their
own convictions when performing their judicial duties, without fear of reprisal by dis-
gruntled parties). See also Lew, Immunity under English Law, supra n.86, at 21 (noting
that English position supportsjudicial immunity to protect judicial independence and
citing availability of impeachment and appeal as further justification).
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unsatisfied parties.' This judicial immunity has been applied
to arbitrators both in English common law and under the U.K.
Act. 164
b. Immunity of Arbitrators
Arbitrators in England enjoy a broad immunity, although it
is characterized as "qualified immunity"1 15 as opposed to the
United States' "absolute immunity."'"" England has generally
treated arbitrators "as akin to judges" and therefore has ex-
tended to them the same immunity as judges."" Although the
U.K. Act codified the immunity of arbitrators,16 there are two
important historical cases worth discussing.'
163. See Garnett, 153 E.R. at 577 (involving plaintiff who sued judge for assault
where plaintiff entered room during inquisition and refused to exit upon request and
thereupon, judge and officer of court removed plaintiff from room). The court stated
that for the advancement of justice, judges must be immune, so that they may be free
from fear of reprisal and independent in reaching theirjudgments, as all those adminis-
tering justice should be. Id. at 581.
164. See Lew, Immunity under English Law, supra n.86, at 21 (discussing English case
law applying judicial immunity to arbitrators). See also VAN HoF, supra n.128, at 46
(mentioning English case law supports judicial immunity for arbitrators); FOtJCHARD,
supra n.85, at 593 (indicating that both case law and U.K. Act support judicial immunity
for arbitrators).
165. See Lew, Introduction, supra n.86, at 4 (noting that English position on arbitral
immunity is qualified). See also VAN HoF, supra n.128, at 46 (classifying arbitral immu-
nity as qualified in England).
166. See Lew, Introduction, supra n.86, at 4 (indicating that arbitral immunity in
United States is absolute). See also Branson, supra n.86, at 85 (noting that United States
grants immunity to arbitrators for all actions related to fulfilling their arbitral duties).
167. See Lew, Immunity under English Law, supra n.86, at 21 (noting England tradi-
tionally extended judicial immunity to arbitrators because of judicial function of arbi-
trators). See also VAN HOF, supra n.128, at 46 (noting that arbitrators have been treated
similarly to judges); FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 593 (noting that in England, judicial
function of arbitrators justifies extension of immunity).
168. See 1996 Ch. 23 Sec. 29 (extending immunity to arbitrators for all acts in
fulfilling their arbitral duties). See also Critchlow, supra n.87 (noting U.K. Act clarifies
arbitral immunity); Carbonneau, supra n.92, at 191 (stating that U.K. Act grants immu-
nity to arbitrators).
169. See Sutcliffe, [1974] 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 318 (finding that arbitrators enjoy immu-
nity but holding architect was not arbitrator where he, in arbitrating dispute, did not
rely on parties for argument and evidence in issuing decision but rather, conducted his
own investigation). See also Arenson, [1976] 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 179 (holding that auditors
were experts in role of valuation and therefore did not extend arbitral immunity). See
generally Lew, Immunity under English Law, supra n.86, at 21 (noting judicial immunity
was historically extended to arbitrators, however definition of arbitrator came under
question in two cases: Sutcliffe and Arenson). Critchlow, supra n.87 discussing Sutcliffe
and Arenson as important historical cases that questioned arbitral immunity in En-
gland); FOUCHARO, supra n.85, at 593 (noting that Sutclife and Arenson questioned
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The first is Sutcliffe, where the House of Lords agreed that
arbitrators clearly enjoyed judicial immunity. 7 ' Lord Reid
stated that the public policy behind judicial immunity equally
applies to arbitrators.'7 1 The basis for the immunity, in large
part, is clearly the 'judicial capacity" which the arbitrator
serves. 7  The House of Lords reemphasized the public policy
behind judicial immunity; indicating without immunity arbitra-
tors' decisions would be subject to the pressures of civil liabil-
ity.
173
In Arenson, the House of Lords stated once again that arbi-
trators enjoy the same immunity as judges when acting in ajudi-
cial capacity. ' 74 Arenson concerned the liability of accountants in
scope of immunity of arbitrators); VAN HOF, supra n.128, at 46-47 (noting that Sutcliffe
and Arenson support judicial immunity for arbitrators).
170. See Sutcliffe, [1974] 1 Lloyd's Rep. (holding that architect who, in arbitrating
dispute, did not rely on parties for argument and evidence in issuing decision but in-
stead, conducted his own investigation and therefore did not grant arbitral immunity).
See also Critchlow, supra n.87 (noting thatjudges agreed that judicial immunity extends
to arbitrators due to their judicial function); Lew, Immunity under English Law, supra
n.86, at 21-23 (noting that doubt arose over absolute immunity for arbitrators in Sut-
cliffe, butjudges clearly found that arbitrators enjoy judicial immunity); VAN HOF, supra
n. 128, at 46 (noting that arbitrators perform fundamentally the same functions as
judges).
171. See Sutcliffe, [1974] 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 320 (finding that argument for respon-
dents started from undisputed rule, based on public policy, that judges are not person-
ally liable for negligence in performing their judicial duties and following this, that
those employed to perform duties of judicial nature are not liable to their employers
for negligence and that this rule historically has been applied to arbitrators). See also
VAN HoF, supra n.128, at 46 (noting that arbitrators perform essentially same functions
as judges and therefore are granted same immunity)
172. See Lew, Immunity under English Law, supra n.86, at 22 (discussing that judicial
immunity is extended to arbitrators due to policy of protecting independence of adjudi-
cator). See also Critchlow, supra n.87 (noting that in Sutcliffe, four judges held that arbi-
tral immunity was clear proposition in law); FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 593 (indicating
that arbitrators were granted immunity due to their judicial function).
173. See Sutcliffe, [1974] 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 320 (noting policy grantingjudges immu-
nity equally applies to arbitrators who perform judicial function). See also Lew, Immunity
under English Law, supra n.86, at 22 (noting that public policy for immunity of judges
applies also to arbitrators); Critchlow, supra n.87 (indicating same rationale for grant-
ingjudges immunity in decision-making applies to arbitrators).
174. See Arenson, [1976] 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 179 (holding that valuers were not arbi-
trators and therefore not extending immunity to them). See also Lew, Immunity under
English Law, supra n.86, at 22 (noting that House of Lords based arbitral immunity on
arbitrators' judicial capacity and held in Arenson that valuers were not functioning in
judicial capacity); Critchlow, supra n.87 (noting that House of Lords extends immunity
to arbitrators for theirjudicial function, but held in Arenson that valuers were acting as
experts).
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valuing shares in a company, not arbitrators.' 7 5 The House of
Lords here considered the immunity of arbitrators and quasi-ar-
bitrators'76 deciding that the quasi-arbitrator must perform aju-
dicial function, not merely a fact-finding or investigative func-
tion. 177 There were Law Lords who disagreed with this reason-
ing and this caused the entire concept of arbitral immunity to be
called into question. 178 Any questions that may have surfaced in
the common law were answered in the U.K. Act.
17
'
Section 29 of the U.K. Act adopts a rule of general immu-
nity for arbitrators in the performance of their judicial functions
as arbitrators."" However, section 29 does allow liability in two
175. See Arenson, [19761 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 187 (finding that accountants were valu-
ers or fact-finders, and therefore they did not perform judicial function). See also Lew,
Immunity under English Law, supra n.86, at 23 (noting valuers acted as experts not arbi-
trators); Critchlow, supra n.87 (noting valuers do not perform judicial function).
176. See Arenson, [1976] 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 179 (finding that auditors, architects and
other experts are quasi-arbitrators). See also Lew, Immunity under English Law, supra
n.86, at 23 (discussing that architects and auditors are quasi-arbitrators); Critchlow,
supra n.87 (contrasting valuers to arbitrators).
177. See Arenson, [1976] 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 179 (holding that valuers are liable be-
cause they did not perform judicial function). See also Lew, Immunity under English Law,
supra n.86, at 24 (discussing Lords Kilbrandon and Fraser, both challenging rationale
behind allowing arbitrators immunity, noting difference in origin of authority, coming
from parties in case of arbitrators and coming from state in case of judges). See also
Critchlow, supra n.87 (noting Lords Kilbrandon and Fraser disagree with arbitral immu-
nity on grounds of different status than judges, coming from relationship between arbi-
trator and parties, as opposed to basing on functions).
178. SeeArenson, [1976] 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 191-93, 199-200 (Lords Kilbrandon, Fra-
ser dissenting in part) (holding that valuers should not be granted immunity but be-
cause judges find power from state and arbitrators find power from contract and there-
fore finding that arbitrators should not enjoy same immunity of judges). See also Lew,
Immunity under English Law, supra n.86, at 24-25 (discussing reasons for not extending
judicial immunity to arbitrators, noting difference in relationship between judges and
parties and arbitrators and parties); Critchlow, supra n.87 (discussing difference be-
tween immunity granted for status of arbitrator versus contractual nature of his rela-
tionship with parties); VAN HOF, supra n.128, at 47 (noting that two Law Lords dissent-
ing speeches, Kilbrandon and Fraser, gave rise to doubts as to scope of arbitrators im-
nmnity).
179. See 1996 Ch. 23 sec. 29 (extending immunity to arbitrators when fulfilling
arbitral duties). See also Critchlow, supra n.87 (noting that U.K. Act clarifies arbitral
immunity); Carbonneau, supra n.92, at 191 (noting that U.K. Act confers immunity,to
arbitrators).
180. 1996 Ch. 23 sec. 29. Section 29 states:
Immunity of arbitrator:
(1) An arbitrator is not liable for anything done or omitted in the discharge or
purported discharge of his functions as arbitrator unless the act or omission is
shown to have been in bad faith.
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circumstances. 8 ' If the arbitrator resigns from the case, he may
be found liable under section 25 if he is unable to show good
reason for resigning. 182 Furthermore the arbitrator will be liable
for any acts or omissions made in bad faith.'," The statute
clearly outlines when an arbitrator is immune and when he may
be liable, but the statute does not define bad faith. 8 4 One com-
mentator suggests that this clearly would not include negligent
acts. 1
85
(2) Subsection (1) applies to an employee or agent of an arbitrator as it ap-
plies to the arbitrator himself.
(3) This section does not affect any liability incurred by an arbitrator by rea-
son of his resigning (but see section 25).
Id. See also Carbonneau, supra n.92, at 191 (noting that section 29 of U.K. Act excludes
liability of arbitrators for all acts and omissions in carrying out their arbitral duties).
181. See 1996 Ch. 23 sec. 29 (stating that immunity is precluded when arbitrator
resigns without good cause or acts in bad faith). See also Carbonneau, supra n.92, at 191
(noting that U.K. Act excludes immunity when arbitrator resigns without good reason
or acts in bad faith); Critchlow, supra n.87 (noting resignation as exception to immu-
nity).
182. 1996 Ch. 23 sec. 25. Section 25 states:
Resignation of arbitrator:
(1) The parties are free to agree with an arbitrator as to the consequences of
his resignation as regards -
(a) his entitlement (if any) to fees or expenses, and
(b) any liability thereby incurred by him.
(2) If or to the extent that there is no such agreement the following provisions
apply.
(3) An arbitrator who resigns his appointment may (upon notice to the par-
ties) apply to the court -
(a) to grant him relief from any liability thereby incurred by him, and
(b) to make such order as it thinks fit with respect to his entitlement (if any)
to fees or expenses or the repayment of any fees or expenses already paid.
(4) If the court is satisfied that in all the circumstances it was reasonable for
the arbitrator to resign, it may grant such relief as is mentioned in subsection
(3) (a) on such terms as it thinks fit.
(5) The leave of the court is required for any appeal from a decision of the
court under this section.
Id. See also Carbonneau, supra n.92, at 191 (noting that Section 25 of U.K. Act excludes
immunity when arbitrator resigns without showing that resigning was reasonable under
circumstances).
183. See 1996 Ch. 23 sec. 29 (stating that arbitrator will not be immune for acts or
omissions made in bad faith). See also Carbonneau, supra n.92, at 191 (noting that bad
faith provision of Section 25 precludes immunity).
184. See 1996 Ch. 23 sec. 29 (stating that acts made in bad faith would preclude
immunity without defining which acts would be considered bad faith). See also
FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 598 (noting that statute does not define what constitutes bad
faith).
185. See 1996 Ch. 23 sec. 29 (stating that arbitrators acting in bad faith would be
subject to liability). See also FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 598 (noting that intentional faults
1856 FORDHAM IN TERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 26:1824
In sum, the historical development in England treated arbi-
trators as adjudicators and therefore in need of the same protec-
tion of judges.'8 6 There arose some question as to liability of
arbitrators under certain circumstances in two famous cases." 87
Most all of the doubt was alleviated in the U.K. Act, which codi-
fied England's position on arbitrators' immunity. 88 Although
the U.K. Act was clear in granting qualified immunity to arbitra-
tors,' 89 there remains a question as to what constitutes bad faith
on the part of the arbitrator.""
would likely fall into bad faith, but indicating that gross faults or gross negligence would
not be uniformly considered bad faith, stating jurisdictions that traditionally assimilate
gross fault and willful misconduct would consider both bad faith).
186. See Lew, Immunity under English Law, supra n.86, at 21 (noting that England
traditionally extended judicial immunity to arbitrators because of judicial function of
arbitrators). See also VAN HOF, supra n.128, at 46 (noting that arbitrators have been
treated comparable to judges due to similarity of functions); FoUCHARD, supra n.85, at
593 (noting that judicial function of arbitrators in England led to extension ofjudicial
inmmnity to arbitrators).
187. See Sutcliffe, [1974] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 318 (finding that architect conducted his
own investigation in issuing decision and therefore holding that architect was not arbi-
trator and did not grant immunity). See also Arenson, [1976] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 179 (hold-
ing that, although arbitrators enjoy immunity, auditors who acted as expert valuers, and
not arbitrators, were not protected by arbitral immunity); Lew, Immunity undo English
Law, supra n.86, at 21 (noting that arbitral immunity was questioned in two cases: Sut-
cliffe and Arenson); Critchlow, supra n.87 (discussing Sulcliffe and Arenson and noting
that cases caused status of arbitral immunity to be questioned); FOUCHARD, supra n.85,
at 593 (noting that Sutcliffe and Areason questioned scope of immunity of arbitrators);
VAN HOF, supra n.128, at 46-47 (noting that although Sutcliffe and Arenson supportjudi-
cial immunity for arbitrators, cases acted to undermine this immunity by questioning its
scope).
188. See 1996 Ch. 23 sec. 29 (stating that, with certain exceptions, arbitrators are
immune for all acts and omissions made in carrying out duties as arbitrators). See also
Critchlow, supra n.87 (noting issues that arose in Sutcliffe and Arenson are now put be-
yond doubt by U.K. Act).
189. See 1996 Ch. 23 sec. 29 (limiting arbitral immunity to acts and omissions made
in discharge of functions). See also Carbonneau, supra n.92, at 191 (noting that U.K.
Act grants general immunity for carrying out duties as an arbitrator); FOUCHARO, supra
n.85, at 593 (noting that U.K. Act confirms case law extending immunity to arbitrators,
but noting that U.K. Act excepts immunity under certain circumstances, namely bad
faith and resignation).
190. See 1996 Ch. 23 sec. 29 (establishing bad faith exception to immunity without
defining bad faith). See also Carbonneau, supra n.92, at 191 (noting that U.K. Act does
not explain what constitutes bad faith); FoUCHARD, supra n.85, at 598 (noting that U.K.
Act does not define bad faith but opining that intentional faults would likely fall into
bad faith, and negligence would not be included as bad faith, but indicating that gross
faults or gross negligence would not clearly be incorporated into bad faith, arguing that
jurisdictions that traditionally assimilate gross fault and willful misconduct would con-
sider both bad faith).
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c. Immunity of Arbitral Institutions
In the United States, the courts determined it was necessary
to extend immunity to the institutions that sponsor arbitrations;
otherwise the immunity arbitrators enjoy would be an illusion.'
England does not protect institutions in as strong of a manner as
the United States."" The U.K. Act describes England's stance
on institutional immunity.' :
Paragraph 1 of section 74 of the U.K. Act protects any insti-
tution that is chosen to nominate the arbitrators for a dispute.' 94
This protection, however, is limited to the function of nominat-
ing an arbitrator."' The U.K. Act does not extend immunity to
acts or omissions done in bad faith.' 6
In paragraph 2 of section 74, the U.K. Act releases the insti-
tution from liability for any acts or omissions of the arbitrator. 9 7
191. See Austern 898 F.2d at 886 (holding that institutions must enjoy same protec-
tion as arbitrators or arbitral immunity will be illusion and finding that federal policies
favoring arbitration provide reason to extend immunity to institutions). See also Corey
691 F.2d at 1211 (finding that holding institutions liable would amount to merely shift-
ing liability from arbitrators to sponsoring associations).
192. See 1996 Ch. 23 sec. 74 (granting immunity to institutions). Compare
FoUCHARD, supra n.85, at 592 (indicating that English arbitral immunity is limited), and
Lew, Introduction, supra n.86, at 4 (characterizing English arbitral immunity as quali-
fied), with FoUCHARD, supra n.85, at 594 (noting that U.K. Act extends arbitral immu-
nity to sponsoring institutions). If the immunity of arbitrators in England is qualified
and this immunity is also granted to institutions that sponsor arbitrations it logically
follows that the immunity of the institution too will be qualified. Cf id. at 592, 594
(noting that arbitral immunity in England is qualified and then that U.K. Act extends
this immunity to sponsoring institutions).
193. See FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 594 (explaining that U.K. Act grants arbitral
immunity to arbitral institutions). See also Carbonneau, supra n.92, at 191 (noting that
U.K. Act confers immunity to institutions sponsoring arbitrations).
194. 1996 Ch. 23 sec. 74 para. 1. Paragraph one of section 74 states:
An arbitral or other institution or person designated or requested by the par-
ties to appoint or nominate an arbitrator is not liable for anything done or
omitted in the discharge or purported discharge of that function unless the
act or omission is shown to have been in bad faith.
Id. See also FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 594 (noting that section 74 of U.K. Act extends
arbitral immunity to institutions).
195. See 1996 Ch. 23 sec. 74, para. 1 (stating arbitral immunity applies to acts or
omissions made in carrying out function of nominating arbitrators). See generally
FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 594 (mentioning that U.K. Act extends immunity to institu-
tions to protect them against dissatisfied parties).
196. See 1996 Ch. 23 sec. 74, para. I (stating that arbitral immunity applies to insti-
tutions unless act or omission is made in bad faith).
197. 1996 Ch. 23 sec. 74 para 2. Paragraph 2 of section 74 states:
An arbitral or other institution or person by whom an arbitrator is appointed
or nominated is not liable, by reason of having appointed or nominated him,
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Although the section grants immunity to institutions for their
own actions in nominating the arbitrators and for any actions of
the arbitrators themselves, it is silent on the scope of that immu-
nity outside those circumstances."" One English commentator
asserts that immunity would not be granted to an institution for
failing to comply with contractual obligations, such as failure to
appoint arbitrators or failure to supervise the proceedings.' 9
The U.K. Act does state clearly, though, that the institution will
have no immunity for bad faith acts in selecting arbitrators, °2 111
and since arbitrators themselves are liable for any bad faith acts,
logically institutions would be liable for all bad faith actions as
well.2111
3. France
The French approach to arbitral immunity represents
greater liability than under English and American law."2° Since
most justifications for arbitral immunity are based on judicial im-
munity, it is important to first consider France's approach to ju-
for anything done or omitted by the arbitrator (or his employees or agents) in
the discharge or purported discharge of his functions as arbitrator.
Id.
198. See Boisseson, supra n.61, at 69-70 (noting that no immunity would likely be
conferred for tailing to comply with contractual obligations, such as failing to appoint
arbitrators at required time or failing to supervise proceedings). See generally Robert
Merkin, Arbitration Act 1996, An Annotated Guide, 111 (LLP 1996) (noting that U.K.
Act narrowly defines circumstances for immunity of institutions).
199. See Merkin, supra n. 198, at 111 (arguing that institutions would be liable when
failing to meet basic elements of contractual obligations). See also Boisseson, supra n.61,
at 69-70 (noting that immunity would not likely be granted to institutions where institu-
tion fails to fulfill contractual obligations).
200. See 1996 Ch. 23 sec. 74, para. I (stating that acts or omissions made in bad
faith would exclude immunity).
201. See 1996 Ch. 23 sec. 25 (stating that arbitrators are liable when acting in bad
faith). See also Carbonneau, suprfa n.92, at 191 (discussing bad faith provision of section
25). See generally Merkin, supra n.198, at 111 (indicating that institutional liability would
occur for purposeful acts); Boisseson, supra n.61, at 69-70 (noting that institutions
would be liable for purposeful acts).
202. See Lew, Introduction, supra n.86, at 4 (noting that United States provides
strongest immunity and that England provides comparable immunity to United States
although qualified and that France allows for liability of arbitrators). Compare Delvolvc,
supra n.86, at 33, 37 (noting that arbitrators in France do not enjoy immunity, but have
some protection in their decision-making function), with Branson, supra n.86, at 96
(describing United States' position on liability of arbitrators and arbitral institutions as
absolute), and Lew, Immunity under English Law, supra n.41, at 27 (concluding that im-
munity of arbitrators in England is limited).
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dicial immunity.203 France, however, does not have as direct of a
connection between judicial immunity and that of arbitrators
and institutions.2()4
a. Immunity of Judges
Historically, French judges were not personably liable forju-
dicial acts except under very narrow circumstances.20 5 Under
the provisions of article 505 et seq. of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure, the French doctrine of prise d partie provided four circum-
stances in which ajudge would be personally liable.2 6 Although
this system permitted a claim for damages against a judge, the
strict procedural requirements effectively denied its applicabil-
i 207 .ity." ,
The law was reformed in 1972 to allow for liability in the
case of faute lourde (gross negligence) or a dni de justice (denial
203. See Branson, supra n.86, at 87 (noting that United States continues to base
arbitral immunity on that of judges). See also Lew, Immunity under English Law, supra
n.86, at 21 (noting that arbitrators are treated akin to judges thus enjoy similar immu-
nity); FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 590 (noting that French law on judges does not apply to
arbitrators); Franck, supra n.88, at 44-45 (noting that judicial liability and arbitral liabil-
ity in France are comparable).
204. See FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 590 (indicating that laws applying to judges are
not applicable to arbitrators in France because arbitration is private form ofjustice).
But see Franck, supra n.88, at 44-45 (noting comparability ofjudicial liability and arbitral
liability).
205. See Code de Procedure Civil [C.P.C.] art. 505 (1830) (Fr.) (establishing four
circumstances under which judge could be personally liable). See also Delvolv6, supra
n.86, at 29 (noting that French Code of Civil Procedure allowed for liability but nar-
rowly construed conditions under which liability could occur).
206. See C.P.C., art. 505 (stating judges may be held personally liable under four
circumstances). See also Delvolv6, supra n.86, at 30 (noting four conditions under which
judge could be held liable and noting that these were so narrowly construed that they
were effectively useless). The four circumstances were, one, in the case of ajudge hav-
ing been held guilty of dol, fraud, concussion, that is to say the worst kind of misconduct
which one can imagine of ajudge, two, in the case of a law having specially provided for
such a Inise d partie, three, in the case of a law providing specifically that ajudge be held
liable to pay damages, and, four, in the case of a dini de justice. Id. See also Y. Lobin,
Responsabilite des magistrates Jurisclasseure Proddure civile, 1 74, No. 98 (discussing four
elements of prise i partie for judges and noting difficulty of invoking them).
207. See Delvolv6, supra n.86, at 30 (noting that procedural requirements for
claims against judges made it very difficult to win award against judges). The require-
ments were, one, only the judges of ordinary courts were subject to a prise d partie, two,
there was no guarantee that the judge would be solvent, three, the conduct necessary
for "dol, fraude, concussion" were so narrow even gross misconduct was not enough, and
four, if the claim was dismissed, the claimant paid a heavy fine. Id.
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of justice).2" 8 The French law adopted the perspective that a
judge's error is a fault in the judicial system and therefore the
state should pay damages and not the judge.21 "' The Cour de Cas-
sation, the highest court in France, defined gross negligence as
an error so egregious that a reasonably conscientious judge
would not have committed it.2 " A denial of justice is a judge's
refusal to make a judgment when the matter is ready for a deci-
sion.2 1'
In sum, French law states thatjudges can be liable, but only
under very narrow circumstances.1 Therefore, a judge can be
personally liable for a fault committed in carrying out hisjudicial
functions.2  Notably, however, the state, as the guarantor of the
judicial system, pays any damages assessed against a judge.2t 4
208. Code de L'Organisation ludiciaire [C.O.J] art. 1-781-1 (Fr.). Article L781-1
states in relevant part:
The State will make reparations for damages caused by a failure of justice.
This responsibility will only occur tor a Jfute !ourde or a deni dejusice....
The State guarantees the victims of the damage caused by the personal fault of
judges and other magistrates, but may still be indemnified by the judges or
magistrates.
Article 505 of the Code de Procdure Civil will remain in force, except for the
sections concerning the personal liability of judges.
/d. (author's trans.)..See Delvolv6, supra n.86, at 30-31 (discussing statute and noting
that under new reform,ijudges can be liable for Joule lourde (gross negligence) and deni
dejustice (denial ofjustice)); FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 590 (indicating liability of French
,judges can only occur in case of gross negligence or denial of justice).
209. See Delvolv6, supra n.86, at 30-31 (noting state claims responsibility for any
defects in system ofjustice). See also FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 590 (noting that state, as
guarantor, assumes liability for judge's actions).
210. See Cass. Civ. I. 13.10.1953, Bull. Civ. 1. No. 224. See also Delvolv6, supra n.86,
at 31 (noting thatfaute lourde is not statutorily defined but that Cour de Cassation defines
it in opinion).
211. See C.P.C., art. 506 (stating that deni de justice is when judge will not make
decision when matter is ready for decision); Code Civil [C. Civ.], art. 4 (Fr.) (stating
that when judge refuses to render judgment regarding matter ready for decision, he
committed dni dejstice); Code Penal [C. P6n.], art. 185 (Fr.) (defining deni dejustice as
when judge will not make judgment on matter ready for decision). See also Delvolv6,
supra n.86, at 31 (defining deni de justice as judge's refusal to render judgment when
matter is ripe for decision and citing Codes that define it).
212. See Delvolv6, supra n.86, at 32 (noting that judges are liable, even if liability is
limited to narrow circumstances). See also FoUCHARD, supra n.85, at 590 (noting that
judges are liable in either of two circumstances, namely gross negligence or denial of
justice).
213. See Delvolv6, supra n.86, at 32 (concluding that judges in France are liable in
carrying Out their duties). See also FoucitHARD, supra n.85, at 590 (noting that liability of
judges in France is possible, though limited).
214. See Delvolv(i, supra n.86, at 30 (indicating that in case of liability state pays
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This liability is narrowly construed, based on the public policy
that judges need protection from liability for independence in
their decision-making; but this narrow construction is not
deemed "immunity.'2 15
b. Immunity of Arbitrators
The liability of arbitrators is comparable to that of judges,
even though the French approach to arbitral liability is distin-
guishable from the approach to judicial liability.216 The statutes
regarding judges do not apply to arbitrators.217 According to
French law, the arbitrator is not a judge and is, therefore, more
easily susceptible to liability.2 m'
Arbitrators, however, have been excluded from liability
based purely on a disagreement with their decision because of
their judicial function. 2 " The Paris Tribunal of First Instance
held that, because of this judicial function, an arbitrator could
damages). See also FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 590 (noting that state must compensate
parties for loss occurring as result of judge's liability).
215. See Delvolv6, supra n.86, at 30 (noting that limitingjudicial liability is based, in
part, on need forjudicial independence). See also Franck, supra n.88, at 17-18, 45 (not-
ing that concept of absolute immunity in civil law jurisdictions does not exist and fur-
ther noting that judges can be liable for wrongdoing).
216. See FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 589 (noting similarity ofjudges and arbitrators).
See also Franck, supra n.88, at 45 (noting liability of arbitrators is comparable to that of
judges in France).
217. See FoUCHARD, supra n.85, at 590 (noting that arbitration is private form of
justice, whereas litigating in national courts is public and therefore statutes applying to
judges do not apply to arbitrators). See also Delvolvo, supra n.86, at 32-33 (noting that
legal text governing liability of arbitrators in France does not exist).
218. See Henri Motulsky, Jlcrits, 2 ETUDES ET NOTES SUR L'ARBITRAGE 5, 15 (1974)
(noting that arbitrator does not become judge, even momentarily and therefore can
incur liability under regime more straightforward than that of judge). See also
FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 590 (describing private nature of arbitration); Delvolv6, supra
n.86, at 32-33 (noting that no legal text governs liability of arbitrators in France).
219. See TGI Reims, Sept. 27, 1978, Floragne v. Brissart et Corgi6, No. 482/77,
(unpublished) (involving plaintiff who sued arbitrator for loss suffered as result of
award against them and finding that plaintiff's arguments amounted to claiming that
arbitrators reached wrong decision and noting that arbitrators could only be liable in
event of gross fault, fraud or connivance with one of parties and therefore dismissed
action). See also FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 590-91 (noting plaintiff's argument
amounted to nothing more than disagreeing with arbitrator and therefore court disal-
lowed liability); Delvolv6, supra n.86, at 35 (noting arbitrators are not subject to suit for
erroneous judgment); Ren6 David, L'arbitrage dans le commerce international, no. 2989,
381 (stating it is certain that arbitrators will not be liable for merely erroneous judg-
ment).
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not be sued as a substitute for an action against award .2 2 " Al-
though the Court was careful not to exclude an arbitrator's per-
sonal liability, the Court protected arbitrators in reaching its de-
cision. 21
Even though there is no statutory provision dealing directly
with arbitrator liability, French courts would likely hold an arbi-
trator liable for contractual obligations.22 2  This liability may
turn on whether the court characterizes the arbitrator's obliga-
tions as rsultat (an obligation to produce a result) or diligence (a
duty of care) .12' An arbitrator will be contractually liable for re-
signing after his appointment and before meeting his obliga-
tions, committing a dtni de justice, failing to make an award
within the contractual time limit, bias, negligence, or breach of
confidentiality.
224
Although the reasoning and basis for the liability or exclu-
sion thereof is different, the French law is in practice close to the
English position22' An arbitrator will be immune from liability
220. See Florag-ne, No. 482/77, (dismissing plaintiffs claim because it amounted to
merely disagreeing with decision). See also FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 590-91 (noting that
courts disallow liability for attacks on arbitral awards); Delvolv6, supra n.86, at 35 (indi-
cating that arbitrators cannot be sued merely because party disagrees with decision);
David, supra n.219, at 381 (noting that arbitrators cannot be liable for erroneousjudg-
ment).
221. SeeJune 13, 1990, Bompard v. Consorts C., 1996 REV. ArB. 476, 1st decision,
translated in 6 INT'I. ARB. REP. FIO (Aug. 1991) (holding that action cannot lie against
arbitrator's award because of judicial function). See also FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 591-
592 (noting no liability for arbitrators in reaching their award but potential for liability
for fault); Delvolv6, supra n.86, at 35 (noting that even bad decisions should not result
in liability); David, supra n.219, at 381 (stating as certain principle that arbitrators will
not incur liability for bad decision).
222. See Delvolv(, supra n.86, at 34-36 (suggesting that contractual liability would
result for failure to fulfill contractual duties), See also VAN HOF, supra n. 128, at 47-48
(noting that, in France, there is contractual liability for arbitrators); FOUCH,\rD, supra
n.85, at 591 (noting that arbitrators in France might incur contractual liability).
223. See Delvolv6, supra n.86, at 34 (asserting that courts in France will hold con-
tractual duties to consist of one of two levels: rgsultat and diligence). See also VAN HoF,
sulra n. 128, at 47-48 (discussing obligations under resultat and diligence and noting that
failure to meet obligations under resultat would automatically result in liability).
224. See Delvolv6, supra n.86, at 34 (noting that arbitrators will be held contractu-
ally liable for failing to fulfill the terms of reference and noting specifically when this
liability would occur). See also VAN Hop, supra n.128, at 47-48 (noting that, in France,
arbitrators are contractually liable).
225. See 1996 Ch. 23 sec. 29 (extending immunity to arbitrators in England). See
also Carbonneau, supra n.92, at 191 (noting that England grants general immunity for
carrying out duties as an arbitrator under Act); FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 593 (noting
that England confirms case law extending immunity to arbitrators in U.K. Act, but not-
2003] OVEREXTENDING IMMUNITY 1863
as to his decision.2 ' However, unlike England, in France an ar-
bitrator would be contractually liable for faute lourde, or any gross
or intentional fault, causing the arbitrator to fail to perform his
contractual obligations.227
c. Immunity of Arbitral Institutions
French law protects arbitrators in a similar manner to how it
protects judges, although, the basis for that protection is differ-
ent; 22 therefore the application of this protection to institutions
is more attenuated. 2 9 Under French law, courts affirm the con-
tractual relationship between the parties and the institution.23 °
The French courts find it unnecessary to treat institutions as ju-
dicial bodies.23 1
In a recent case, Socit Cubic Defense System v. Chambre de
Commerce Internationale, the Cour de Cassation recognized a con-
tract between the parties to the arbitration and the ICC.2 3 2 The
ing that U.K. Act excepts immunity under certain circumstances, namely bad faith and
resignation).
226. See Delvolv6, supra n.86, at 34-36 (suggesting that contractual liability would
result for failure to fulfill contractual duties). See also VAN HOF, supra n.128, at 47-48
(noting contractual liability for arbitrators in France); FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 590-92
(noting that arbitrators enjoy protection in reaching decision).
227. See Delvolv6, supra n.86, at 34-36 (discussing that arbitrators have potential
liability in France for failing to meet contractual duties). See also VAN HOF, supra n.128,
at 47-48 (indicating that arbitrators' liability in France is limited to faute lourde);
FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 590-92 (concluding that arbitrators would likely be contractu-
ally liable for fault in France).
228. See Delvolv6, supra n.86, at 34-36 (noting that arbitrators are not viewed as
judges and are held contractually liable, although they are protected in making deci-
sions in order to protect judicial independence, not arbitrator). See also FOUCHARD,
supra n.85, at 590-92 (noting that arbitrators are notjudges and may be held contractu-
ally liable, but are granted protection against attacks for erroneous decisions).
229. See FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 594, 602-04 (indicating that arbitral institutions
do not act as arbitrators and therefore are not afforded same protection). See also Gail-
lard, supra n.85 (noting that arbitral institutions are civilly liable for failing to meet
contractual obligations).
230. See FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 602-03 (discussing that contractual relationship
exists between parties and institution in France). See also Gaillard, supra n.85 (indicat-
ing that French courts look to contractual nature of relationship between parties and
arbitral institution).
231. See FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 594, 604 (noting that institutions are service
providers and not judicial bodies and noting French courts correctly do not treat them
as judicial bodies). See also Gaillard, sup.ra n.85 (noting that institutions serve primarily
as administrators).
232. See Soci~t6 Cubic Defense System v. Chambre de Commerce Internationale,
Cass. le civ., Feb. 20, 2001, available at http://lexinter.net/JPTXT/institu-
tionsd'arbitrage.htm (Fr.) (involving plaintiff who sued ICC for failure to meet its con-
1864 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 26:1824
Court noted that the ICC will not be granted immunity but in-
stead will incur liability for its contractual obligations. 23 " These
obligations are not to ensure perfect arbitral proceedings, in-
stead the Cour de Cassation held that the ICC forms a contract
with each of the parties thereby committing to provide the
means for an efficient arbitration. 234 The institution will be obli-
gated to provide an effective and efficient arbitration, suitable
screening for impartial arbitrators, and a more involved over-
sight of the arbitral process.23 5
Although the Cour de Cassation held that the ICC was not
liable under these facts, the court held that the ICC is contractu-
ally obligated to fulfill its essential function as an arbitral institu-
tion. 2 " This decision stands in contrast to the United States po-
tractual obligations). See also Gaillard, supra n.85 (noting that court recognized con-
tractual relationship between ICC and parties and further recognized that institutions
would be liable for failing to fulfill their contractual obligations); Franck, supra n.88, at
45 (noting that court found contract to exist between ICC and parties); FOUCHARD,
supra n.85, at 594, 603 (citing Cubic case and noting relationship under French law
between institution and parties is similar to contract of agency).
233. See Cubic, Cass. Ie cir. (finding that contractual relationship exists between
arbitral institution and parties to dispute). See also Gaillard, supra n.85 (discussing
court's holding and stating that institution will be liable for failure to fulfill essential
aspects of contractual duty); Franck, supra n.88, at 45 (noting that although court re-
jected liability, court found contractual relationship to exist between institution and
parties); FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 594 (noting that although court will hold institution
to fulfill contractual duties, court has yet to find institution liable).
234. See Cubic, Cass. le civ. (holding that ICC was not liable because contractual
obligations do not create duty to provide perfect arbitral proceedings, but to provide
effective and efficient arbitration). See also Gaillard, supra n.85 (noting that ICC, by
permanently putting out offer to provide services, contracts with parties when they
choose to arbitrate disputes through ICC, and incurs obligation to provide efficient
arbitration).
235. See Cubic, Cass. le civ. (holding that ICC was not liable under the facts but
that institutions would be liable for failing to provide efficient and effective arbitrations,
suitably screening arbitrators, and sufficiently governed proceedings). See also Gaillard,
supra n.85 (noting that court would hold institution liable for failing to provide effi-
cient arbitration).
236. See Cubic, Cass. le civ. (finding that institutions' obligations consist of provid-
ing efficient and effective arbitrations, adequately overseeing proceedings, and prop-
erly screening arbitrators). See also Gaillard, supra n.85 (noting that essential functions
of institutions consist of providing efficient and effective arbitration, overseeing pro-
cess, and screening arbitrators). See generally Franck, supra n.88, at 45 (noting that insti-
tutions undertake obligation to perform contractual duties when sponsoring arbitra-
tions); FoUCHR\rD, supra n.85, at 594 (noting that institution's would likely be liable in
France for failure to meet contractual duties). Even though the French position clearly
states that an institution may be liable contractually, a court has yet to find one liable.
Id. (stating that French courts have yet to find institutions liable).
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sition in Austern v. Chicago Board Options Exchange.237 These cases
introduce the question of how to properly view the relationship
between the parties and the arbitral institution.23" The next sec-
tion will discuss the main theories as to how this relationship
should be characterized and how these theories affect whether
to grant arbitrators and arbitral institutions immunity or hold
them liable.
B. What is the Nature of the Relationship?
1. Arbitrators and Parties
Underlying the relative immunity or liability of arbitrators is
a theory of the relationship between the arbitrator and the par-
ties.23 9 Commentators agree that there is tension is between the
contractual nature of the relationship and the jurisdictional na-
ture of the relationship, or the relationship forming out of the
arbitrator's "status" as an adjudicator.2 4° Commentators further
note that along this same continuum a tension exists between
granting immunity to arbitrators for their status as adjudicators,
and holding them liable for their contractual duties; the more
strictly contractual the relationship, the closer to complete liabil-
ity and the more strictly jurisdictional the relationship, the closer
to complete immunity.241
237. See Austern 898 F.2d 882 (holding institution enjoys same immunity as arbitra-
tors). See also Gaillard, supra n.85 (noting that Cubic decision stands in contrast to Aus-
tern case and most courts' general blanket of immunity).
238. See FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 600-04 (discussing two characterizations of rela-
tionship between either arbitrators and parties or institutions and parties as being ei-
ther contractual or one of status). See also Yu, supra n.87, at 114-21 (discussing in detail
characterizations of nature of relationship between arbitrators and parties and institu-
tions and parties); Critchlow, supra n.87 (noting both contractual and status character-
istics of relationship).
239. See FOUCHARO, supra n.85, at 600-04 (noting that relationship between either
arbitrators and parties or institutions and parties could be based on contract or based
on status). See also Yu, supra n.87, at 114-121 (noting that contractual relationship be-
tween arbitrators and parties or institutions and parties comes from appointment of
arbitrator or institution by parties and status relationship comes from position of arbi-
trato.rs and institutions).
240. See FoUCHARD, supra n.85, at 600 n.198 (noting characterization of relation-
ship changes result in granting immunity versus qualified immunity versus liability). See
also Yu, supra n.87, at 117 (discussing differing views on nature of relationship and
impact view has on immunity).
241. See Yu, supra n.87, at 1 5-119 (noting that viewing the relationship between
arbitrator and parties to dispute as contractual leads to view of complete liability and
and as jurisdictional, or one of status, leads to view of absolute immunity). See also
1866 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL IAWJOURNAL [Vol. 26:1824
Most scholars agree that there is a contractual nature to the
relationship between the arbitrators and the parties to a dis-
pute.2 42  However, arbitrators do have status as "private
judges. '24 1 In order for courts to recognize them as possessing
judicial power and thus enforcing their decisions, arbitrators
must have this "status."24 4 This does not exclude the contractual
nature of the relationship.245 First, the arbitrator is able to hear
the claims of the parties only because the parties themselves
have empowered him to do so. 24 6 They may have done so by
directly appointing the arbitrator, or by some other method,
nevertheless intending to resolve their dispute through an arbi-
trator.2 4 7 Second, the arbitrator voluntarily consents to being an
FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 600-04 (noting that absolute liability comes out of status view
of relationship and liability comes out of contractual view of relationship).
242. See FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 600 (noting that most commentators support
contractual nature of relationship). See generally ALAN REDFERN AND MARTIN HUNTER,
LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2d ed. 1991) (noting
contractual nature of relationship between arbitrators and disputing parties in En-
gland); Murray L. Smith, Contractual Obligations Owed by and to Arbitrators: Model Terms of
Appointment, 8 ARB. INT'L 17 (1992) (discussing contractual obligations arbitrators owe
to disputing parties in England). Bernd von Hoffmann, Die internationale Schied-
srichtervertrag - eine kollisionsrechtliche Skizze, in Festchrift Ftlr Ottoarndt Glossner Zum 70
GEBURSTAG 143 (1993) (noting contractual nature of relationship between arbitrators
and parties in Germany). Giuseppe Mirabelli, Contratti nell'arbitrato (con l'arbitrato;
con l'instituzione arbitrale), 30 RAss. DELL'ARB. 3 (1990), and the references cited
therein (noting contractual relationship exists between arbitrators and disputing par-
ties and institutions and disputing parties). MARCEL Huys, Guy KEUTGEN, L'ARBITRAGE
EN DROIT BELGE ET INTERNATIONAL, para. 174 (1981) (noting that arbitrators and arbi-
tral institutions owe contractual duties to disputing parties in Belgium). RENE DAVID,
ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 292 et seq. (1985) (discussing in comparative law
that there is contractual relationship between arbitrator and disputing parties and be-
tween arbitral institutions and disputing parties).
243. See FOUCIIARD, supra n.85, at 600 (explaining notion that arbitrators have sta-
tus as private Judges). See also Yu, supra n.87, at 117 (discussing arbitrators roles and
commentators who characterize the relationship as stemming from status as adjudica-
tors).
244. See FOUCI-lARD, supra n.85, at 600 (noting that arbitrators decisions are recog-
nized by courts due to their status as private judges). See also Yu, supra n.87, at 117
(indicating that in order for arbitrators decisions to be recognized they must have status
as decision-makers).
245. See FOUCI-ARD, supra n.85, at 601 (noting that contractual relationship can
coexist with status). See generally Yu, supra n.87, at 115-117 (discussing both contractual
theory of relationship and jurisdictional theory of relationship, or status).
246. See FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 601 (noting that arbitrator's authority to hear
case stems from contract, not status as adjudicator). See also Yu, supra n.87, at 115 (not-
ing that relationship between arbitrator and parties originates in arbitration agree-
nent).
247. See FoUCHARD, supra n. 8 5, at 601 (noting that parties have choice in selecting
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arbitrator.2 48  This consent concludes the contract, creating
rights and obligations for both the arbitrator and the parties. 249
2. Arbitral Institutions and Parties
Arbitral institutions do not act as arbitrators and, therefore,
the relationship between institutions and the parties is somewhat
different than that between the arbitrator and the parties.250
The institution puts out a permanent offer to contract by draft-
ing and publishing its rules and providing fixed conditions for
acceptance. 25 ' The parties accept the offer when they agree to
resolve potential disputes through a particular institution in
their contract with each other..2 52 The contract is not perfected,
however, until the parties request arbitration, thus notifying the
institution of their acceptance.253
In general, arbitral institutions simply police or administer
arbitration as method of dispute resolution, and either directly or indirectly select arbi-
trator to resolve dispute). See also LoOKOFSKY, supra n.17, at 559 (discussing contractual
nature of arbitration); Fischer, supra n.17, at 30-33 (noting that parties are free to
choose to arbitrate and contract away right to access court).
248. See FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 601-02 (noting that no one is ever obligated to
assume role of arbitrator). See generally Franck, supra n.88, at 5-6 (noting that arbitra-
tors can create their own express rights in terms of their appointment agreement with
parties).
249. See FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 602 (noting that contract between arbitrator and
parties is concluded when arbitrator accepts appointment). Broadly speaking, the du-
ties of arbitrators fall into four categories: the duty to act equitably and impartially,
complete functions within contractual deadlines, pursue functions until the final award
is made, and maintain confidentiality. See id. at 609-23 (discussing rights and obliga-
tions of arbitrator in general).
250. See FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 602-03 (noting that arbitral institutions do not
act as arbitrators and that when parties agree to arbitrate with institution and institution
receives request for arbitration, contract forms between them). See also Franck, supra
n.88, at 7-8 (noting that when parties agreed to submit their decision to arbitral institu-
tion, contract is formed between institution and parties).
251. See FoUCHARD, supra n.85, at 602 (noting that institution puts out offer to
contract by publishing rules aimed at undetermined individuals but with fixed condi-
tions). See also Franck, supra n.88, at 7-8 (noting that when parties agreed to submit
their decision to arbitral institution, contract is formed between institution and par-
ties).
252. See FOuCHARD, supra n.85, at 602 (noting that parties accept offer by includ-
ing clause to resolve potential disputes through arbitral institution in contract). See also
Franck, supra n.88, at 7-8 (noting that parties, by agreeing to resolve dispute through
arbitral institution, form contract between institution and parties).
253. See FoUC:HARD, supra n.85, at 602-03 (noting that contract is not perfected
until institution receives notice through receipt of request for arbitration by parties).
See also Franck, supra n.88, at 7-8 (noting that contract forms between institutions and
parties when parties agreed to submit their decision to institution).
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the proceedings. 254 One commentator suggests that this rela-
tionship is similar to a contract of agency, where the institution
performs various acts on behalf of the parties.255 However, the
same commentator also notes that the relationship is also com-
parable to a contract for the provision of services, where the in-
stitution provides certain services for the parties. 256 Whatever
the characterization of the relationship, the question that
emerges is whether an institution, as an administrator of the pro-
ceedings, should benefit from the immunity afforded to arbitra-
tors for their judicial function.5 7
C. Criticism of Absolute Immunity of Institutions
Some criticism of absolute immunity for institutions has
emerged. 58 Commentators assert that absolute immunity will
discourage arbitration as a means of dispute resolution.25" Fur-
thermore, scholars note that institutional rules play a role in the
parties' choice of an institution; 2111 therefore, in allowing the in-
stitution to disregard its own rules, the choice of the parties is
254. FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 603 (noting that arbitral institutions role is one of
oversight and administration). See also Allen, supra n.24, at 59 (discussing that one role
of arbitral institutions is administrating proceedings). See generally GARNETr, supra n.24,
at 33-34 (discussing institutionally administered arbitrations).
255. FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 603 (noting that under French law, relationship be-
tween parties and institution is like that of contract of agency, due to the institutions
duty to perform tasks on behalf of parties).
256. Id. at 603 (noting similarity of relationship between institution and parties to
contract for provision of services, where institution agrees to perform tasks necessary to
provide parties with arbitration). See also Allen, supra n.24, at 59 (discussing tasks arbi-
tral institutions undertake in administering arbitration). See generally GARNETT, supra
n.24, at 33-34 (discussing arbitrations administered through institutions).
257. See FoUCIIARD, supra n.85, at 604 (questioning whether institution, as service
provider, should be granted immunity likened to that of arbitrators). See also Franck,
supra n.88, at 28 (noting that institutions should not be free to disregard their own
rules).
258. See Franck, supra n.88, at 28 (indicating that arbitration should balance con-
cerns of protecting judicial function with honoring parties choices in contracting with
arbitral institution). See also Sponseller, supra n.88, at 439 (arguing that arbitration
organizations should be held liable for damages caused by improper administrative
tasks).
259. See Franck, supra n.88, at 27-28, 58-59 (arguing that absolute immunity will
discourage arbitration whereas qualified immunity will serve to foster arbitration). See
also Sponseller, supnra n.88, at 439 (arguing public policy justifies holding arbitration
associations liable for breakdowns in arbitration process).
260. See Franck, supra n.88, at 27 (noting that rules likely play role in parties'
choice of institution). See also Harrison, supra n.69, at 94-95 (noting that institutional
rules indicate type of arbitration proceeding to potential parties).
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frustrated. 26' Critics argue that absolute immunity works to dis-
courage arbitration, whereas qualified immunity will work to im-
prove and foster arbitration.262
Notably, commentators have opposed some of the various
justifications that courts offer in support of absolute immu-
nity. 26 - Institutions do not need absolute immunity in order to
protect arbitrators and judicial independence. 64 If institutions
were immune from the actions of the arbitrator, but liable for
their administrative function, the arbitrator's independence
would not be threatened.6 5 One commentator further notes
that public policy supports holding institutions liable because in-
stitutions are in the best position to insure against liability.26 6
Commentators note that even if national courts allowed for
the complete liability of arbitral institutions, a party would still
have to move beyond the exclusion of liability clauses in institu-
tional rules in order to successfully sue an institution.2 67 How-
ever, the validity of these rules is untested.268 Scholars suggest,
261. See Franck, supra n.88, at 28 (concluding that institutions should not be per-
mitted to disregard their own rules and parties' agreement). See also Harrison, supra
n.69, at 94-95 (noting that institutional rules enable parties to anticipate type of arbitra-
tion).
262. See Franck, supra n.88, at 30 (discussing policy arguments against immunity,
noting immunity frustrates parties decisions). See also Sponseller, supra n.88, at 439
(arguing that qualified immunity is better for arbitration).
263. See Franck, supra n.88, at 30 (noting that immunity encourages carelessness).
See also Sponseller, supra n.88, at 439 (arguing public policy reasons for holding institu-
tions liable for failure to provide proper arbitral process).
264. See Sponseller, supra n.88, at 439 (discussing liability of institutions for own
faults as opposed to arbitrators' failures, and noting that this would still protectjudicial
independence). See also Franck, supra n.88, at 30 (noting that institutional immunity is
not necessary as means of protecting arbitrators' judicial independence).
265. See Sponseller, supra n.88, at 439 (noting that judicial acts limitation on im-
munity would serve same function as liability for institutions for own faults in adminis-
tering proceedings). See also Franck, supra n.88, at 30 (noting that immunity encour-
ages carelessness by removing incentives to be cautious and that institutional immunity
is not necessary as means of protecting arbitrators' judicial independence).
266. See Sponseller, supra n.88, at 439 (noting that institutions can best spread risk
and insure against liability).
267. See FoUCHARO, supra n.85, at 603-04 (discussing institutional rules excluding
liability, and questioning their enforceability). See also Gaillard, supra n.85 (noting that
validity of institutional rules excluding liability is of great importance where state laws
may allow for liability of institutions).
268. See FOUCHARD, supra n.85, at 623 (asserting that it is unlikely that exclusion of
liability clauses have power to exclude liability where national laws deny arbitral immu-
nity). See also Gaillard, supra n.85 (noting that enforceability of exclusion of liability
clauses is questionable).
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along with a French court, that these rules are'likely to be found
invalid, as against public policy. " 9
III. PULLING BACK: HOLDING INSTITUTIONS LIABILE FOR
ESSENTIAL CONTRACTUAL DUTIES
Part I discussed the general background underlying arbitra-
tion law and institutions. Part II discussed three nations' ap-
proaches to immunity in arbitration. Part II then discussed sev-
eral characterizations of the relationship both between the dis-
puting parties and the arbitrator, and between the parties and
the arbitral institution. Part III will argue institutions provide a
different function than arbitrators and therefore should not be
afforded immunity on the same basis. Part III will also argue
that arbitral institutions should be liable as the Cour de Cassa-
tion held. Furthermore Part III will discuss the impact this posi-
tion will have on both the clients of institutions and the institu-
tions themselves.
A. Must the Institution be Immune?
The arbitral institution has been extended the same immu-
nity as an arbitrator in the United States. 271' The courts deemed
this extension as necessary, otherwise the immunity granted arbi-
trators would be illusory.2 7' This conclusion does not follow. 272
1. Protecting the Arbitrator's Decision - Avoiding Unduly
Influencing His Decision
An institution can be liable for its own actions in a manner
269. See Gaillard supra n.85 (noting that issue is untested, however noting that
French Cour d'Appel questioned validity of such provisions in Cubic case, although not
addressing issue in reaching holding). See aLho Cubic, Cass. I e civ. (questioning validity
of institutions' rules excluding liability); FoUC'HARD, supra n.85, at 623 (noting that no
legal system allows unlimited exclusion clauses, further noting public policy against
such provision in contracts of adhesion and noting that most Ijurisdictions will be unwill-
ing to enforce exclusion clauses imposed upon parties rather than negotiated).
270. See supsra nn.11043 and accompanying text (discussing United States' posi-
tion on immunity of arbitrators and arbitral institutions).
271. See supra nn.127-40 and accompanying text (mentioning two cases that rely
on principle that arbitral immunity must be extended to institutions or else, immunity
extended to arbitrators is illusory).
272. See supra nn.263-65 and accompanying text (arguing that granting immunity
to institutions is unnecessary to protect arbitrators' "judicial acts").
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in which the arbitrator will not be affected.27' This is not an
unlimited liability, but a contractually liability where the contrac-
tual duties are to provide an efficient and effective proceeding,
not a perfect arbitration.2 7 4 The challenge will logically come
from the party who lost the arbitration, because the winning
party has benefited from the wrongful action of the institu-
tion. 75 But an arbitrator's decision should not be influenced by
the possibility of a suit against the institution, based solely on the
fault of the institution itself." 76 Perhaps courts have been afraid
to open the door of liability, eventually engulfing all aspects of
arbitration. This also does not follow. The liability to institu-
tions can be limited expressly in a statute as in England, 7 or in
application as in France.2
2. Supporting Arbitration
A second faulty reason was that the court must support arbi-
tration and, in order to do so, must insulate institutions from
liability.2 79 If courts allow institutions to fail to fulfill their con-
tractual obligations, leaving the injured party without a remedy,
they will discourage arbitration's growth.8t Making the institu-
tions liable for their own faults will only ensure that the arbitra-
tion process is attractive.2 11
273. See supra n.196 and accompanying text (discussing U.K. Act excluding institu-
tional liability for acts or omissions of arbitrators).
274. See supra nn.228-35 and accompanying text (discussing French position on
institutional liability).
275. See supra nn.105, 114, 116, 151 and accompanying text (mentioning policy of
insulating judges from liability to protect integrity of their decisions).
276. See supra nn.263-65 and accompanying text (noting arbitrator's decision will
not be threatened by possibility of institutional liability where institution itself is at
fault).
277. See supra nn.190-201 and accompanying text (discussing qualified immunity
under U.K. Act).
278. See supra nn.225-36 and accompanying text (discussing French position on
liability of arbitral institutions and discussing Cubic case).
279. See supra nn.1-16 and accompanying text (discussing Austern case and U.S.
Act's policy of promoting arbitration and holding that making institutions liable dis-
courages arbitration).
280. See supra nn.258-62 and accompanying text (arguing absolute immunity will
discourage arbitration, whereas qualified immunity will serve to foster arbitration).
281. See supra nn.258-62 and accompanying text (noting that absolute immunity
will discourage parties from choosing arbitration, whereas qualified immunity will en-
courage arbitration).
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3. Ensuring that Institutions Are Willing
to Provide Arbitrations
Another potential argument against liability is that the insti-
tutions will not want to sponsor arbitrations if they are held lia-
ble. 82 This too is faulty. Doctors do not discontinue their pro-
fession because they may be liable for mistakes in performing
their profession. Engineers do not cease to build structures be-
cause they would be held responsible for injuries resulting from
their own fault. Institutions provide a service at a price, and will
continue to do so, so long as it is profitable.2 8
4. The Effects of Liability
If liability increases the costs of institutions these costs may
be passed on to the users.2 84 On the other hand, the institutions
will be more careful in carrying out their duties. If institutions
are held to fulfill the essence of their contract, an effective and
efficient process, then the standard is low enough for institutions
to easily avoid liability.2 "5 Furthermore, institutions are in a bet-
ter position to insure against the risk of liability, thus spreading
and reducing their costs, as opposed to individuals who could
not realistically insure against potential negligence on the part
of institutions.286
B. A Legally Sound Approach
This Note argues for an approach similar to the approach
shown in the Cubic case.2"87 This view is supported by (1) the
contractual relationship between the parties and the institution,
(2) ensuring the independence of the decision from liability by
making the institution liable only for its non-judicial activities,
and (3) the policy of bettering arbitration as a service for its cli-
ents.
282. See supra nn.118-21 and accompanying text (noting other professions where
liability does not prevent the profession from continuing to prosper).
283. See supra nn.119, 121 and accompanying text (discussing profitability among
other professions that are subject to liability).
284. See supra n.121 (noting minimal costs if any will be passed on to the users).
285. See supra nn.231-36 and accompanying text (discussing standard for liability
under French law where institutions are held to fulfill the essence of their contract).
286. See supra n.266 and accompanying text (noting that institutions can better
insure against liability).
287. See supra nn.225-36 and accompanying text (discussing Cubic case).
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1. Contractual Obligations
Under this approach, the contract between the parties and
the institution is given effect.2"8 They are assured that the insti-
tution will provide the services for which they pay.299 An institu-
tion has yet to have been held liable in France. 29 ' The standard,
low as it may be, presumably would have held the CBOE liable in
Auslern for invalidly impaneling a tribunal. 29 ' But this may have
created fault even in England, arguably under the bad faith pro-
21vision.  )2 The CBOE must have been aware of its own rule with
regard to the composition of the arbitral panel. Therefore, their
decision to select all five arbitrators from the securities industry
could be argued as having been a bad faith decision, thus incur-
ring liability under the U.K. Act.
2 11
2. Judicial Function
Do arbitral institutions serve solely ajudicial function? Even
the broadest construction of the phrase judicial function would
leave some of their duties outside this interpretation. 294  The
courts should exclude from liability only the actions of arbitral
institutions that directly touch an arbitrator's decision. And the
institution should be responsible to provide the necessary means
to achieve an effective and efficient arbitration.295
3. A Service for the Users
This Note began by discussing the decision between arbitra-
288. See supra nn.236-57 and accompanying text (discussing contractual nature of
relationship).
289. See supra nn.51-66 and accompanying text (discussing varying reasons for
choosing an institution). If a party chose an institution because of its particular rules
and then the institution can disregard its own rules without incurring liability, the
party's decision is being nullified. See supra nn.258-62 and accompanying text (arguing
parties' decision is frustrated where institutions are allowed to ignore their own rules).
290. See supra n.236 (stating that institutions have yet to be found liable).
291. See supra nn.1-16 and accompanying text (discussing rules of the CBOE and
their disregard of said rules).
292. See supra nn.191-201 and accompanying text (discussing bad faith provisions
in U.K. Act).
293. See supra nn.191-201 and accompanying text (noting that bad faith acts under
U.K. Act create liability).
294. See supra nn.250-57 and accompanying text (discussing relationship between
the parties and the institution).
295. See supra nn.225-36 and accompanying text (discussing standard in Cubic
case).
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tion and traditional litigation. 2 "-  The arbitration process is de-
signed as an alternate to traditional litigation and exists for the
clients themselves.9 7 Institutions should be held liable in the
interest of the users. Arbitration institutions will only continue
to exist so long as the law retains sufficient hold over them to
prevent any injustice.2 "H Granting arbitrators immunity is neces-
sary to protect their impartiality in making their decision.29
Since the institution does not make the award, the same policy
consideration does not exist, except where the institutions' ac-
tions are closely related to the decision. As previously argued,
this liability will only act to bolster the growing reputation of ar-
bitration as a reliable and just alternative to traditional litiga-
tion.300
C. What about the Institutional Rules Excluding Liability?
The rules of institutions excluding their own liability have
yet to be tested by a court.'"'l Each decision granting immunity
was based on the national laws and not on the institutional
rules.3 02 Under a contractual approach it would seem appropri-
ate to allow the parties to decide. Yet it is far from certain
whether these clauses would be valid."' :
CONCLUSION
Arbitration institutions should not be granted absolute im-
munity. They operate in a non-judicial manner and do not en-
joy the "status" of an arbitrator. The contractual nature of the
relationship between the parties and the arbitral institution
296. See supra nn.20-57 and accompanying text (discussing businesses' decisions in
arbitrating versus litigating).
297. See supra nn.20-29 and accompanying text (noting arbitration as alternative to
traditional litigation).
298. See supra n.23 and accompanying text (indicating necessity of maintaining
control over arbitration to ensure its continued popularity).
299. See supra nn.103-05, 114-16, 142, 149-51 and accompanying text (discussing
need for judicial independence from liability).
300. See supra nn.276-79 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of liability
on institutions).
301. See supra n.267 and accompanying text (noting that no case exists where insti-
tution was released from liability due to exclusion clause).
302. See supra n.267 and accompanying text (noting that courts based decisions on
national laws and not institutional rules).
303. See supra nn.267-69 (noting that it is unlikely that institutions could insulate
themselves from liability in jurisdictions that held them liable).
2003] OVEREXTENDING IMMUNITY 1875
should raise contractual duties and obligations. Failure to fulfill
those duties and obligations should raise liability. For the bene-
fit of the parties and ultimately the institutions, the institutions
should be legally required to deliver reasonable administrative
expectations under their agreement, in providing an effective
and efficient arbitration process according to the applicable
rules.

